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ABSTRACT
COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT IN A COOPERATIVE:
PROBLEMATIZING PRODUCTIVITY AND POWER
by

Avery Edenfield
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016
Under the Supervision of Professor Dave Clark
Since the mid-twentieth century, the structure of the workplace has undergone a
transformation. While the conventional firm with its rigid bureaucracies is still in use, many
businesses have grown increasingly flexible, flat, and polycentric: “empowerment” and
“innovation” are the coin of the realm. As the way we work changed, professional
communication scholarship pivoted to consider communication practices in these structures.
While professional communication scholars have long discussed these kinds of
organizations, they have not discussed an increasingly popular alternative: cooperatives. Owned
and operated by the people who use them, these organizations can significantly affect the
communities in which they operate. To contribute to the rhetorical knowledge of cooperatives, I
conducted a qualitative study at the Riverwest Public House Cooperative (“Public House”). This
project extends research of flat organizations by investigating a cooperative business. I draw my
research questions from the concerns scholars identified in other kinds of organizations: namely,
the role of genres in configuring power and facilitating organizational change (Clark 2006;
Devitt 1991; Spinuzzi 2007; Star 1991; Winsor 2003; Zachry 2000).
1. How does a cooperative employ genres differently?
2. What do these texts tell us about how power is distributed in a cooperative?
3. How do the genres it employs affect organizational change?
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These questions helped me better understand the connections between negotiations of power and
texts at work in this particular business, leading me to several findings:
1. Genres. Collaboratively produced texts are the backbone of consensus-based decisionmaking. Unlike conventional organizations, in a cooperative, many (though not all)
stakeholders are given access to governance. For instance, documents like an incident
report or safer space policy have greater social significance when they are not only
produced by agreement but also enforced through agreement.
2. Organizational Change. The Public House underwent a managerial overhaul during my
study. Like conventional businesses, change occurred through a confluence of material
circumstances and individual and organizational goals; however, due to the absence of
formal structure, in this instance, a broader range of individuals was able to institute
structural change.
3. Distribution of Power. In place of hierarchy, rhetorics of empowerment and democracy
were deployed horizontally to task employees with managerial duties without financial
rewards.
For this project, I provide an interdisciplinary take on hierarchy and organizational structure by
examining one cooperative, still in its infancy, through the lens of genre and power in the
workplace.
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Chapter 1: Cooperatives, Collective Management, and Hierarchy:
Rationale and Relevance for Study
Vignette 1: Jamal has worked for two years as the lead bartender for the Workers’ Collective,
the committee of workers who democratically manage the bar. After starting school, he finds he
is overwhelmed and decides to step down. The bar operates fine without a lead bartender for a
few months, but soon maintenance tasks start to fall through the cracks, scheduling gaps occur,
and inventory and finance officers operate without input from the group. The Board of Directors
gives the Workers’ Collective a deadline to decide how they will manage themselves. At the next
workers’ meeting, the Collective revisits the job description of the lead bartender, paring down
the description to fit the bar’s current needs, and then makes changes in Google Docs. They
agree one person could perform the tasks—most of what was previously performed by Jamal.
The workers decide to revisit the decisions they have made in two weeks, then three months, and
then one year. Finally, one worker nominates another for the position. After it is seconded, a vote
is taken. The nominee is brought back into the room and congratulated on her new position as
lead bartender.
Vignette 2: After a year in the same position, Liz believes she deserves a raise. After consulting
with co-workers, she pitches her own wage hike at a policy session of the Workers’ Collective.
In the meeting, Liz begins by drawing attention to the shared ethic of fair wages and valued
labor, reminding the group that her experience should bring higher pay. She points out her
dedication and dependability, closing her case by suggesting she take on additional duties. After
discussion, the group votes in favor of the wage hike for the position in general and a raise
specific for Liz, with the addition of the extra duties she suggested.
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Introduction
With over 3,000 members and a hundred active volunteers, the Riverwest Co-op and Café
has operated in the Riverwest neighborhood of Milwaukee, Wisconsin for 13 years, relying
almost completely on volunteer labor (riverwestcoop.org/about/history). Volunteers stock
products, run the register, clean, and complete many necessary tasks around the grocery store. In
return, volunteers receive a free meal in the café and a discount in the grocery store. Each year,
hundreds of volunteers flood the cooperative to help with completing inventory.
In the same neighborhood, participants in the Riverwest24 (riverwest24.com), a leaderless,
cooperatively organized annual bicycle race, complete a five-mile loop between houses and
businesses on busy city streets. It is completely volunteer run, from organizing volunteers and
event details, designing the website, tracking laps and checkpoints both digitally and manually,
cooking and washing dishes (no paper plates or plastic ware!) for nearly a thousand people, and
cleaning up the city blocks after the race. If organizations like these examples operate
cooperatively, does it change the nature of their work? How does a neighborhood cooperative
come into existence in the first place and what can we learn about the way they write their
documentation together, work together, and solve problems together?
Evident in these stories, cooperatives can fundamentally drive a local economy.1 What the
above observations demonstrate is cooperation and collaboration as “business.” Each of these
success stories of cooperation functions by collective management: management by a group of
workers or volunteers, rather than a general manager. I argue this success may problematize what
we think we know about organizational structure and the role of hierarchy.

1

A cooperative is an ownership model. A collective is a management model.
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In the past, professional communication scholarship often assumed an organization marked
by hierarchy and bureaucracy; however, as new technologies have changed the way we work,
scholarship has shifted toward investigating flatter, more autonomous work in the form of teams
or networked organizations. Scholars like Spinuzzi, Clark, and Winsor have found correlations
and dissimilarities between the models in the way power and communication works, arguing
power and relationships extend beyond the top-down structure (Spinuzzi 2007, 2014; Winsor
2001; Zachry 2000; Zuboff 1988). In doing so, scholars have identified that even within an
apparently hierarchical structure, communication and power are more omnidirectional than they
may appear at first (Winsor 2003). In their research, they have unveiled the many means by
which horizontal organizations may enact subordinating configurations of power through
management mechanisms (Clark 2006; Longo 2000; Spinuzzi 2007; Sussman, Adams, Kuzmits,
and Raho 2002; Winsor 1996, 2003; Zuboff 2006). Scholarship suggests flat organizations may
enact power differently, in large part through genres, and may fall short of actualizing goals of
workplace autonomy.
Researchers have studied the flow of information through an organization as it is channeled
to affirm and reinforce the extant power structure of the superior-subordinate relationship
(Fragale, Sumanth, Tiedens, and Northcraft 2012; Longo 2000; Sussman et al. 2002; Winsor
1996, 2003). For example, in Spurious Coin, Longo deploys Foucauldian concepts of discipline
and panoptic oversight as a point of inquiry for a top-down structure, arguing hierarchal
management ensures—and relies on—subordinate discipline and an internalization of rules
(2000). Relying on the same work by Foucault in Writing Power, Winsor analyzes the role of
genres in shaping and maintaining these structures of control, noting genres play a major role in
defining a hierarchy within an organization (1996, 2003). Similarly, Zachry’s historical
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examination of genres rests on a history of downward communication (2000). For instance, he
points out stable genres developed at the Rath Packing Plant exert control; peoples’ work
activities, identities, and positions within the company were dictated in part by genres supporting
a bureaucratic hierarchy (65, 66, 68). Clark extends Bourdieu’s notion of capital to analyze
narratives of empowerment and the regulation of hierarchies, observing these narratives are too
often about employee bribes for doing more work with little reward, financial or otherwise
(2006).
While these scholars carefully examine configurations of power in an organization, many
take the presence of a hierarchy for granted. Tim Kastelle, professor of innovation at the
University of Queensland Business School, recently wrote that among organization and business
researchers, there is an underlying assumption that a hierarchy is necessary, and, therefore, many
businesses and university business programs teach with the following assumptions.


You need a hierarchy to succeed.



The people who do the work are of lower status than those who decide what work to do.



Organizations that do not follow the norms are likely to fail (Kastelle 2013; see also
Rinehart 2006).

Furthermore, Kastelle identified challenges to making the case for the need for non-hierarchical
businesses.


Many people do not believe in democracy in the workplace.



Even if you do believe in democracy, it can be hard to imagine work without hierarchy.



People fear the unusual.



It is hard to change organizational structures (Kastelle 2013).

Despite the fact that many still believe hierarchy is important, and alongside the current trends
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toward polycentric, flat businesses, for the past two centuries, cooperatives have challenged this
unequal distribution of power and are currently experiencing a significant boom, supported by
local and federal governments, university researchers, and urban and rural development
programs (Dewan 2014; Restakis 2010). I aim to extend professional communication research of
flat, flexible organizations by including cooperatives. I believe it is important to do so because
cooperatives can provide a clear contrast between organizations that claim autonomy and
empowerment while structurally maintaining hierarchy, and those who try to enact it.

Conventional Business
Hard pressed to envision any realistic alternative, most people accepted these rules and the
hierarchical distinctions they entailed. In this way managers and workers, fitfully, kept the faith.
-Shoshana Zuboff

While Winsor, Spinuzzi, Zachry, Clark, and others have done much to unveil the
complexities and contradictions in hierarchical, command-and-control organizations and to
respond to the shifting nature of work, collective management that is deliberately democratic has
yet to be substantially studied by professional communication. Nevertheless, this research is
valuable because, at least in part, this type of organization responds to the failures and criticisms
against conventional firms. This section provides an interdisciplinary literary review of hierarchy
in business management and points out important contrasts to a cooperative.
Fragle et al. begin their study of structure and communication with this useful definition of
hierarchy:
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Hierarchy—the unequal distribution of status and power among individuals in a
collective—is a defining feature of organizations (Pfeffer 1992; Leavitt 2005;
Mannix and Sauer 2006; Magee and Galinsky 2008; Gruenfeld and Tiedens
2010). Individuals’ desires to gain status and power through hierarchical
advancement are often characterized as fundamental human motives (Winter
1973; McClelland 1975). In any given group hierarchy, individuals generally wish
to move toward the top, where the greatest power and status reside. (Fragle et al.
373)
Echoing Kastalle’s claims of its ubiquity, Fragle et al. position hierarchy as a fundamental
feature of organizations, and the desire to move up the hierarchy as a fundamental human desire.
Taylorism has become the reigning metaphor for bureaucracy and command-and-control,
the rationalization of work through scientific study and management. Its philosophy is
inextricable from today’s version of post-industrial capitalism and modern management
strategies (Murphy 2011; Rinehart 2006). Kastelle, Zuboff, and others have pointed out
hierarchy remains deeply ingrained in the way we think about doing business, bolstered in part
by its entrenchment in the curriculum of business schools (Kastelle 2013; Clark 156; Zuboff
233). Taylor arguably made a lasting contribution to American management in the measurement
and rationalization of work in two meaningful ways: first, by breaking labor into smaller tasks;
secondly, by extracting and displacing the knowledge of the labor process from the employee to
the supervisor, decoupling idiosyncratic know-how from the laborer. In this way, conventional
businesses are easily recognizable by asymmetrical bureaucracy based fundamentally on the
concepts of ownership (Zuboff 225).
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Importantly, rationalization is one of the lasting impacts of Taylorism in American
management. Zuboff writes rationalization “was transformative upon American managers and
their claims to authority. They learned… that the interior of the labor process had to be
penetrated, explicated, and rationalized” (230). Rationalization of labor relies on the panoptic
gaze of the manager upon the managed. This shift from workers owning their work habits and
managing their labor, to management owning the labor and, during the time of employment, the
laborer, is the root of Taylorist power (Zuboff 1996; Rinehart 2006).
This top-down structure is one of the most fundamental differences between conventional
and collective management; namely, mechanisms were designed to exact the most from an
employee in the most efficient way for the maximum profits to the investors/owners and
maximum benefit for the worker (Drucker 1987; Longo 2000; Rinehart 2006; Zuboff 1988).
Taylor himself describes the design as focused solely on mutual prosperity.
The principle object of management should be to secure the maximum prosperity
for the employer, coupled with the maximum prosperity for each employee…
maximum prosperity for each employee means not only higher wages than are
usually received by men of his class, but of more importance still, it also means
the development of each man to his state of maximum efficiency…(10-11)
The scientific management system methodically rationalized labor, seeking to maximize profit
and efficiency to benefit both the employee and employer (Drucker 1988; Longo 2000; Taylor
1911). Unlike cooperatives, which define themselves as balancing between profit and
community development, Taylorism and approaches like it emphasize profit as the primary
motivation for the worker, manager, and investor. Taylor’s scientific management “provides the
ultimate rationale for managerial authority” (Zuboff 230).
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Surveillance and Control
Rationalization of labor depends in part on observation and surveillance (i.e., the
manager’s gaze). Longo deploys the Foucauldian concept of panoptic oversight and discipline as
a point of inquiry for the conventional firm. Like Zuboff, Longo argues hierarchal management
ensures subordinate discipline and an internalization of rules, and that hierarchical management
is rooted in regulating labor (2000). Like Drucker and others, Longo links the beginnings of
management as a control system like Taylorism with the rise of scientism and engineering. Due
to the evolution of engineering in large, complex organizations, engineers were tasked with
designing social systems along with the mechanical systems of production and operation.
These designs for social control were termed, ‘management systems’…As
engineers designed management systems to make workers as efficient as the
machines with which they worked, they also designed intricate technical
communication systems as the mechanisms for effecting operations control for
maximum efficiency. (79)
These systems of control and discipline “worked to make an organization’s production more
efficient by measuring each worker’s performance and comparing it to pre-established
performance and quality standards,” standards developed by Taylorists (Longo 79; Rinehart
2006; Taylor 1911; Zuboff 1988). Longo and Winsor have both pointed out that the ongoing
examination for and correction of deviance from standards, the soul of American management, is
a Foucauldian “normalizing gaze” (Longo 80; Winsor Writing Power 7). This oversight strips
workers of previously held idiosyncratic judgments and decision-making power on how work
should be done, how intensely they work and when, and how to manage their time. In a sense,
Taylorism is a response to previously held autonomous power by the laborers and an attempt to
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seize control of worker’s labor from the worker to the overseer.
Rinehart identifies Marxist ideas of alienation and worker discontent as reactionary to these
systems of command and control (12). In a nod to worker management in the past, Longo,
Rinehart, and Zuboff draw a stark contrast from the standardization, control, and fragmentation
of workers from each other into disparate parts of a machine, against the previous guild-type of
management structure. Longo writes:
This type of measuring and comparing viewed workers as individual units of
production, not as members of collectives such as crews, gangs, or guilds as they
were formally conceptualized… This function of measuring and comparing
individual performance against standards for production and quality allowed
systematized management to operate through constant examination of machines
and workers. (79; See also Foucault 1975; Zuboff 1988)
Winsor found similar viewpoints of worker-as-machine, pointing out how technicians were
viewed as mechanisms, designed to work as efficiently as possible (2007).
Panoptic oversight at the core of hierarchal management facilitates “the penetration of
regulation into even the smallest details of work within in the systematically managed
operation,” stripping away shop workers’ decision-making power; Longo writes, “written
operation standards dictated in detail the most efficient ways to do their work” (Longo 80, 198).
Rinehart also references the stripping of idiosyncratic judgments as key to managing and
controlling the labor process and, consequently, the laborer.
Just as workers must give up their capacity to control the product of their toil,
they also cede their ability to determine the intensity and duration of work; to
define the manner in which work is organized, divided and allocated; and to
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determine the tools and machines used in the production process. Furthermore, it
is the employer who decides whether or not work will be performed at all. (12)
Dissimilarly, a worker cooperative or collective emphasizes the value of labor and the selfinterest of the laborer contrasts sharply with a workers’ lack of autonomy (Polletta 183).
Rinehart and others argue the current worker cooperative style of management we have owes its
existence to a reaction against dehumanization and bureaucracy, the search and elimination of
any deviance from efficiency standards (Rinehart 2006; Williams 2007).
Workers have been encouraged to surveil each other since the emergence of scientific
management (Billeaux et al. 2011; Rosenthal 2013; Longo 2000; Zuboff 1988). In fact, mutual
policing is essential to management, the key factor that separates management from the shop, the
field, or the sales floor. For workers to report on each other, they must first see themselves as
unassociated with one another, and then must have “internalized the control system and its
standards for behavior before they can be motivated to report abnormal behaviors on the part of
other workers” (81). This progressive fragmentation of labor and individualization of workers
functions not only to micromanage tasks but also to divide and conquer, a strategy designed to
encourage workers to see themselves as isolated individuals who were rewarded or punished
apart from one another (Longo 81, 128).
One mechanism of panoptic oversight ensuring internalization of the rules is the affinity
between the worker and the manager, whereas the worker can now take place in her own
regulation. Though there was some resistance by labor unions and other labor organizing efforts
(Longo 2000; Rinehart 2006; Zuboff 1988), Longo argues workers were further divided from
each other by efforts to “transcend the hierarchal control” and, ultimately, to report on each
other. Fortified by the religion of the American dream of success and consumerism (Murphy
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2011; Williams 2007; Zuboff 1988), by the religious piety of the protestant work ethic (Zuboff
1988), and by the religion of authority (Zuboff 1988; Arendt 1961), workers participated in their
own regulation.
Hierarchical management depends in part on what Arendt calls the spiritual dimension of
power, together rendering constant external surveillance unnecessary “in the smoothly running
panoptic system” (Arendt 1961; Longo 81). Longo, Zuboff, and Rinehart argue the protestant
work ethic undergirds the notion of hierarchy as obedience to “God’s natural law.” Protestant
asceticism contributed to religious and social notions of hierarchy as “God’s natural order”
(Zuboff 225). Eventually a reliance on “God’s law” was replaced with concepts of ownership,
hard work, and entrepreneurship (Longo 2000; Rinehart 2006; Zuboff 1988). According to
Zuboff, the emerging belief became that due to his hard work, the entrepreneur was rewarded by
the system with success, “achieving grace,” and, most importantly, this success was available to
anyone willing to exert the right amount of disciplined effort (226).
The promise of “grace” in the form of upward mobility and increased capital maximized
consent of the workers. Zuboff writes, “These currents of feudal piety, Lockean individualism,
Social Darwinism, and economic pragmatism animate U.S. labor law even as they inform the
daily experiences of managers and workers” (Zuboff 238). Panoptic discipline—penetrating the
minutia of labor—and other mechanisms of control are lynchpins of this form of hierarchical
management. Longo, Rinehart, and Zuboff demonstrate when workers complained that this
system was dehumanizing, managers often argued that this system of control was “natural,” and
an inevitable relationship,” appealing to natural law (Longo 2000; Zuboff 1988; Arendt 1961).
Drawing from Weber, Locke, Smith, and Arendt, Zuboff describes the connection between
obedience, control, and hierarchy as fundamentally and historically infused with spiritual values

11

as a way of ensuring obedience.
Since authority presupposes the unity of command and obedience, the use of
coercive power implies that, to some degree, authority has failed. Similarly,
authority can be defined in contradistinction to persuasion and dialogue, since
obedience to authority is achieved through a belief in the hierarchical order that
creates the mutuality of command and obedience. Legitimate authority need not
depend on violence or reasoned argument to elicit the desired action. (221)
Like Arendt, Zuboff contends authority is the “spiritual dimension of power” that depends on
faith in a meaning system that “decrees the necessity of the hierarchical order,” (222) and
requires “the collective participation in a system of meaning that goes beyond the immediate
context, those who command or obey, and reaches into the domain of transcendent values…”
(222). The “meaning” of the system comes to resemble a natural order; Zuboff writes, “The
hierarchical order is meaningful and acceptable as long as people believe that such ranking rules
reflect a higher order of moral necessity” (222). Echoing Kastelle’s claims, Zuboff challenges
the seemingly innocuous, natural role hierarchy plays in our workplaces.

Genre of Control
While Zuboff challenges the naturalizing of hierarchy in American businesses, in Writing
Power, Winsor studies the role of genre in upholding such asymmetrical power relations.
Winsor’s analysis of genre builds off Longo’s and Foucault’s research on power and discipline,
and describes the role of genres as shaping and maintaining relationships of subordination and
power (1996, 2003). Resonant with Arendt and Zuboff, she writes:
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Management was not a brute assertion of power. Rather, managers worked at least
partly through controlling representations: they created representations of their
own decisions and plans that were addressed to workers, and they required
workers to create regulated representations of their activity that managers could
use in decision making. Regulating through institutionalized representations
meant that they were able to embed management concerns into the culture and
practices of the organization itself so that most members engaged in carrying
them out even without direct supervision from a manager. (52)
For Winsor, surveillance and discipline are embedded in organizational culture in part through
representations. Just as Winner, Rinehart, and Longo point to the use of technology as
mechanisms of control, Winsor demonstrates how organizations institute genres to preserve a
hierarchy. Importantly, in such a structure, genres are created, institutionalized, and then
functioned as gatekeepers of access and hierarchy over time. Drawing on Foucault, Giddons,
Latour, Miller, and Longo, Winsor demonstrates it is within complex networks where genres
take shape and then, conversely, shape the workflow through asymmetrical power relations.
Organizations tend to institutionalize genres that reinforce existing power
relationships so that not all the writing people do is equally likely to be
recognized as part of an organizational genre… Also, in their institutionalized
form, organizational genres are not equally available to everyone in an
organization. Rather, they become resources only for those who are authorized to
use them. (Writing Power 10)
Winsor fuses Miller’s definition of genre as social action where genres “represent a confluence
of the creation of knowledge and the enactment of power” (Writing Power 16), with a
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Foucauldian understanding of power as “…not a quality that anyone can ‘hold’ but a relationship
that is always locally generated using means that include, but are not limited to, positions in a
hierarchy….” (7). Control of representations is symbolic power.
This confluence of symbolic power and knowledge creation is similarly important in nonhierarchical business. In a collective, genres are essential stabilizing tools, keystones of
collaboration, coordinated action, and deliberation (Winsor 2007). These boundary objects are
points of agreement between disparate communities and, due in part to inevitable turnover, shape
an organization over time (Star 1989). Devitt, Winsor, and Miller have shown genres are a
stabilizing force (Devitt 1991; Miller 1984; Winsor 2007).
If, as Miller and others posit, genres are typified responses to typified social situations,
genericised textual responses to a recurring situation, then understanding the social situations
genres respond to is key to investigating networks of power in an organization (Miller 1984;
Spinuzzi 2007; Winsor 2003), especially an organization that is as conscious of power relations
as flat, flexible organizations.

Flat and Non-hierarchical Organizations
In the last three decades, business and organizational researchers have studied the
complexities and challenges of flat arrangements (Bosley 1991; Clark 2006; Conklin 2007;
Drucker 1988; Gee, Hull, and Lankshear 1996; Johnson-Eilola 1996; Kastelle 2013; Leenders,
van Engelen, and Kratzer 2003; Spinuzzi 2008, 2013, 2015; Star 1995; Waterman Jr. 1990;
Williams 2007; Zuboff 1988). In a polycentric structure, each unit is specialized and virtually
autonomous, reporting to the top while a centralized authority governs operations (Drucker 1987;
Longo 2000; Winsor 2001; Zuboff 1988). These “flat structures” are less hierarchical, though not
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necessarily more democratic, than conventional businesses (Drucker 1988; Williams 2007;
Zuboff 1988). Drucker differentiates between command-and-control management styles like
Taylorism from flat or “knowledge-based” management styles (3). Drucker points to the
hospital, the symphony, or the British civic system in colonized India as examples of
organizations functioning more or less horizontally, outside of the command-and-control style of
traditional business (3): each unit is specialized and virtually autonomous, reporting to the top
(5-6).
In his essay on flat structures, Drucker identifies four main issues with this type of
management, issues that collective and cooperative management may also face.
1. Developing rewards, recognition, and career opportunities for specialists.
2. Creating a unified vision in an organization of specialists.
3. Devising the management structure for an organization of task forces.
4. Ensuring the supply, preparation, and testing of top management people. (8)
A flat structure does not necessarily mean a business is democratically controlled. It can still be
autocratic with a central, single key player (Drucker 1987; Zuboff 1988).
Recent scholarship has taken up the concern of how this shift from top-down, commandand-control to team-based, decentralized work affects employee empowerment and agency
(Clark 2006; Johnson-Eilola 1996; Spinuzzi 2013, 2014, 2015; Wilson 2001). With what they
have termed “new capitalism,” Gee, Hull, and Lankshear summarize this shift in work
organization with four points.
1. Productivity is based on knowledge, science, and technology.
2.

Information and knowledge process are dominant, key activities for multinational
businesses.
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3. Companies are organized in radically different ways emphasizing flatter organizations,
fewer levels of hierarchy, more cooperation, and flexible employees.
4. Competition and the market are now global and focused solely on rapidly fulfilling each
individual customer’s needs. (36-42)
However, Gee, Hull, and Lankshear argue employee agency under new capitalism is not
empowerment at all. According to Faber’s summary of their studies,
[They] argue that the rhetoric of new capitalism is “insulting to workers” despite
its desire for fully informed and participatory employees. Although change
projects… talk about empowered workers, information sharing, critical (outsideof-the-box) thinking, and creative expression, employees cannot actually engage
in such behavior if the consequences are detrimental to the organization. The
employees only have agency insofar as this agency acts in the interests of the
company. (64-65)
While the language of new capitalism emphasizes empowerment and creativity, employees are
constrained by the interests of the company. This creates a paradox between self-management
and oversight: while promoting autonomy, creativity, and self-management, employees must
internalize the ethos of the company to know where those limits are. Gee, Hull, and Lankshear
write:
[T]he newly empowered and newly “critical thinking” workers cannot really
question the goals, visions, and values that define the very parameters of the new
capitalist business... The worker’s “freedom” is fixed within the margins of the
goals, ends, and vision set by the new capitalism and its theoreticians. The
problem can be put another way: real commitment and belief… require that
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learners be able to engage in genuine dialogue and contestation with viewpoints,
but such genuine contestation is ultimately problematic in a business setting
where, in the end, profit is the goal and the competition is at one’s heels. (qt. in
Faber 65)
Faber, Gee, Hull, Lankshear, and others argue new capitalism calls for a deeper level of
investment shrouded in the language of democracy, but without the rewards (Clark 2006). Faber
best sums up the contradiction between the language of new capitalism and actualization of
employee agency: “Despite the claims of employee agency and accountability, the same
dominant structures continue to rule the global playing field” (66). While they analyze the
structures that enable and support inequity, they do not go so far as to take up other kinds of
structures like cooperatives as alternatives that try to attain a business without inequity.
There are several shapes to flat arrangements of a workplace with a range of political
commitments, each based on principles of autonomy and collaboration. Here, I focus on the
network and its variants, comparing three types of organizations, broadly defined, along a
spectrum of managerial oversight, from adhocracies to anarcho-syndicalism. While cooperatives
may incorporate these arrangements, these examples are not cooperative per se as the defining
feature of a cooperative is shared ownership and voluntary participation.

Adhocracy
Adhocracy is a way of structuring around small ad hoc teams, rejecting or blending
“bureaucracy,” and “cutting through organization charters, departments, functions, job
descriptions, hierarchy, and tradition” (Waterman Jr. 16). Waterman Jr. writes that ad hoc work
groups can bring breakthroughs, creativity, and innovational problem solving when traditional
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channels have failed. Creating a space theoretically outside hierarchical leadership roles of the
organization, an ad hoc team purportedly levels the playing field in an effort to bring new ideas
to the table (Waterman Jr. 1990). Waterman Jr. notes adhocracies often operate alongside
bureaucracies, and are reactions to the stultifying effects of these bureaucracies, which he argues
can inhibit change (17). In contrast, adhocracies are flexible. On the nature of bureaucracy,
Waterman Jr. writes:
Structured work drives out the unstructured; that’s almost the law of nature. The
nature of adhocracy is both unstructured and very important, whereas the nature
of bureaucracy is transfixed by structure and trivia. Because the structured
organization takes precedence, opportunities get missed, crucial issues go
unresolved, and efforts to change usually get nipped in the bud. (97)
Spinuzzi recently updated the concept of adhocracy to the all-edge adhocracy, which he
describes as networked organizations characterized by “flat structure, changing composition,
flexibility, and adaptability” (Spinuzzi 2013). According to Spinuzzi, the 1970s were
characterized by bureaucracies, the 1990s by adhocracies, but the 2010s by all-edge adhocracies,
ad hoc teams that are autonomous and allow for innovation (Spinuzzi 2013).
According to Waterman Jr., adhocracy co-exists alongside bureaucracy as they meet
different needs of the organization. Bureaucracies stabilize while adhocracies innovate
(Waterman Jr. 87). Cooperatives or conventional businesses may utilize ad hoc teams in their
structure. Adhocracies themselves are not necessarily democratic or liberating, but can be
incorporated into many kinds of structures.
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Co-management
In organizations that practice worker self-management, bureaucracy may be rejected
altogether in favor of autonomous teams completely outside of explicit hierarchy, disregarding
social hierarchies that may develop. Recalling Jamal’s replacement through vote in Vignette #1,
in an interview with the BBC, Alcides Rivero describes the sweeping rejection of hierarchy at
one of Venezuela’s government-owned aluminum plants entirely co-managed by the employees:
“It’s us, the workers, who decide on questions of production and technology, and it’s us who
elect who will be our managers,” (Bruce 2005). At the same plant, a member from the personnel
department, Marivit Lopez, draws attention to the budgeting process as all-hands-in: “The
different departmental works councils are discussing and amending the existing proposal so that
we get a budget that really fits the company’s needs” (Bruce 2005). Lopez points to workerfocused polycentric management: each autonomous team works together to benefit themselves
and the company. Like Waterman Jr.’s ad hoc groups, these teams cut across organizational lines
and allow for innovation. However, in this scenario, this organization does not qualify as a
cooperative because ownership of the company rests with the state rather than the workers
themselves.

Anarcho-syndicalism
At the end of the continuum of team-based, flat organizations is a post-capitalist model:
anarcho-syndicalism. IIFOR defines anarchism as “coordination on equal footing, without
superiors and subordinates” (“Horizontal Organization: A Brief Study”). Anarchism, broadly
defined, is a rejection of rule, particularly managerial rule. Anarcho-syndicalism is an anticapitalist philosophy of worker ownership rooted in unionism and total self-management.
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Duncombe describes anarchy as “a close abstraction of the network: voluntary, nonhierarchical,
with omnidirectional communication flows, and each citizen a creator/consumer” (Duncombe
188, qt. Farmer 50) and the modes of communication embody this philosophy. In his analysis of
textual production in this framework, Farmer writes these networks represent “the merging of
organic democratic participation with organic economic and cultural production” (51). Anarchic
organizations are flat with each actor autonomous and independent. Without top-down oversight,
these open, highly participatory organizations may form around an issue—ad hoc and autotelic—
and then disperse. Cooperatives may incorporate aspects of this radical unionism, but a focus on
maximizing individual liberty may make cooperation difficult. IIFOR writes, “The anarchist
ideal has 100% horizontal organization, i.e. 100% socialism and autonomy, no hierarchy, and no
authoritarian relations between people/persons, and no authorities political/administrative and
economically, and no disorganization, chaotical tendencies” (“Economic-Political Sociology and
Industrial Organization Research”; Restakis, 2010).

Figure 1: Overlap of flat arrangements

Each of these types of networked, horizontal organizations represents one way of organizing
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around work in the age of new capitalism. Worker autonomy and flexibility are fundamental
principles in each case, a similar foundation for worker cooperatives. However, cooperatives
take autonomy and democratic participation even further, to shared ownership of the business
itself.

Cooperative Business
Constructed by and for its members, a cooperative challenges basic tenets of conventional
business like top-down exertions of power through surveillance and texts. In this section, I first
provide an overview of a cooperative and highlight some important features: a balance of
community needs and profit, democratic member control, and profitability. I also explore some
of the ways a collectively run cooperative differs from the conventional business model outlined
above.
When the United Nations declared 2012 the Year of the Cooperative (IYC), it cited the
importance of the cooperative to the social and economic wellbeing of the communities they
serve (social.un.org). Because of the potentially unique contributions of cooperatives to
economies of communities, the United Nations has taken a keen interest in cooperative
development.
Cooperatives are business enterprises owned and controlled by the very members
that they serve. Their member-driven nature is one of the most clearly
differentiating factors of cooperative enterprises. This fact means that decisions
made in cooperatives are balanced by the pursuit of profit, and the needs and
interests of members and their communities. (social.un.org)
The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) defines a cooperative as “an autonomous
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association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural
needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise”
(ica.coop). Importantly, advocates are careful to point out that it is this joint and democratic
control and not any kind of eschewing of profit or capital that sets the cooperative model apart
from other ways of doing business. Rather, the cooperative model seeks to balance profit with
the needs of the communities they serve (social.un.org; Williams 2007; Zeuli and Cropp n.d.).

Democratic Control
The cornerstone of a cooperative is democratic control. At least in theory, rather than
ownership and control being in the hands of investors, a CEO, or the owner, the control rests
with the multiple owners of the cooperative, operating on the “one person, one vote” principle
(Zeuli and Cropp 45; see also Cheney 1995; Pittman n.d.; Murphy 2011; Riverwest Public House
Cooperative Bylaws 2011). The foundational principle of democratic control is the barest
definition of a cooperative and a trait all cooperatives share to a degree. In the preface to
Williams’s comprehensive study of cooperatives, Cheney writes:
If there is a family resemblance among organizations which call themselves
cooperatives, we may say that they share these aspects: 1) some commitment to
collective if not necessarily equal ownership by members, 2) some commitment to
democratic decision making by members, and 3) a belief in the viability of like
experiments outside of their own experience. (xiv)
Cheney’s list of three defining aspects of a cooperative describes what democratic control, the
single most distinctive feature of a cooperative, looks like in action: equality in ownership,
democracy in decision-making, and viability of other kinds of experiments outside of their own
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experience. These three aspects, along with other locally contingent values, help shape the
cooperative to fit the particular needs of the community.
Democratic control is not mutually exclusive from profit. However, in the case of the
cooperative, pursuit of profit is tempered by these other concerns and needs that are of equal
importance. In other words, in order to meet these ethical and social obligations, the cooperative
model must also be economically successful, stable, and sustainable.

Profit: Interdependent and Sustainable Communities
Despite the possible complexities and difficulties of democratic control or the long-held
belief in the necessity of the hierarchy in a business (Kastelle 2013; Winsor 2007), profit is not
antithetical to cooperative principles. In fact, a cooperative can be extremely profitable. Zeuli
and Cropp write:
Cooperatives do not, as is sometimes assumed, contradict the goals of capitalism.
If that were the case, cooperatives would not play such an important role in the
American economy. (2)
In fact, large enterprises in the United States are cooperatives, including Recreational Equipment
Incorporated (REI), Ocean Spray, Sunkist, Land O’ Lakes, and over 10,000 credit unions
(Williams 14-16). Internationally, the success of the Mondragon Cooperative has surpassed
expectations, impacting the economy of the Basque region of Spain and serving as an example to
many cooperatives and communities around the world (Billeaux et al. 2011; Cheney 1995;
Dewan 2014; Murphy 2011; Riverwest Public House Cooperative Board Manual 2013; Williams
2007; Zeuli and Cropp n.d.).
The lasting success of cooperatives is due in part to the interdependence of the
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cooperatives and the communities they serve. Williams argues that both the early success and the
long-term sustainability of a cooperative rely on continued community investment, which rivals
or surpasses corporations.
[N]ational records show that 60 to 80 percent of corporations in the US [sic] fail
after their first year in business, and cooperatives fail only at the rate of about 10
percent after their first year (WOCCU 2003). The initial success of a cooperative
most likely arises from the fact that starting a cooperative requires a great deal of
support from the community. Many people must be involved for the successful
cooperative to file for incorporation or limited liability, so that few are likely to
fail within the first few years of operation. Cooperatives are also more likely to
survive in the long term. More than 90 percent of cooperatives are still operating
while only 3-5 percent of standard corporations remain active after five years. (910)
Current research shows this relationship between cooperative ownership and productivity is
more complex than previously thought, and may depend on the level of participation at the
managerial level (Logue and Yates 101-104). Nevertheless, most scholarship agrees that
cooperatives’ commitment to community arises in that it is operated and owned by the
community itself, for the benefit of the community. According to Williams and Murphy, if a
community organizes and opens a cooperative, it will keep the doors open for longer periods,
longer perhaps than corporations will. If a cooperative opens at all, it is statistically going to be
in operation longer than non-cooperative businesses (Dewan 2014; Murphy 2011; Williams
2007).
Scholars have speculated the reason for cooperative profitability and sustainability is that
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most cooperatives are small and labor-intensive and are not reliant on “innovations in product or
technology” (Dewan 2014; Rinehart 2006). There are notable exceptions, but most cooperatives
cannot afford to build their business around innovative technology and instead operate in
industries without that need, which may actually contribute to their success and long-term
profitability (Cheney 1995; Rinehart 2006).
The profitability and sustainability of the cooperative model make it an attractive business
model in the U.S. and abroad. Recent United Nations statistics show the cooperative movement
is expanding in countries all over the world, including the United States.
The country with the largest number of individual members indirectly represented
by the ICA is the United States with 305.6 million members. There are nearly
30,000 co-operatives in the U.S. ica.coop
Cooperatives have been a force in the U.S. economy since its foundation. According to Zeuli and
Cropp, the first cooperative was founded in 1752 and the first cooperative law was established in
1865 (56). Seven percent of the U.S. population are members of a cooperative (12).
The cooperative model is a significant contributor to the U.S. economy. The University of
Wisconsin Center for Cooperatives provides up-to-date statistics in their economic report
“Research of the Economic Impact of Cooperatives.” According to their recent study, nearly
30,000 U.S. cooperatives account for more than


$3 trillion in assets



$653 billion in revenue



Two million jobs



$75 billion in wages (reic.uwcc.wisc.edu/issues/)

So then, contrary to the common belief that cooperatives and democratic control are antithetical
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to profit, scholars have shown that the economic vitality of a cooperative firm can match or
exceed that of conventional firms (Cheney 1995; Fakhfakh, Perotin, and Gago 2009; Dewan
2014; Kastelle 2013). In his response to criticism of the cooperative model as unprofitable,
Cheney counters profitability is required in order for the cooperative to exist, and cooperation
and profit are not mutually exclusive, challenging the assumption that profitability and broader
community goals are incompatible.
For cooperative and alternative organizations themselves, obviously they cannot
have a social impact without sheer economic survival. This is the type of
“realism” typically addressed at those who start up worker and other kinds of coops. The obverse of this question, though, is equally important: of what good is
“prosperity” if it does not include a broader commitment to workers, the
community, and the environment? (xvii)
As Cheney points out, the primary difference between the conventional and the cooperative is
not whether or not either can economically survive, but instead, what prosperity brings. For the
cooperative, the answer lies in part in benefits to its members and the communities in which it
exists, in contrast to a conventional firm that may be driven by profit for shareholders or the
owner (Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). The widespread adoption of the Rochdale principles is an example
of this value-driven economic commitment.

Balance of Community Needs
The Rochdale Principles are foundational values adopted by many cooperatives. These
seven principles are named after the successful Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers in
England in the 18th century, a large successful cooperative that formed because of a labor dispute
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(RWPH Board Manual 2013; Williams 2007; Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). These principles, sometimes
known as the “Rochdale Principles of Cooperation,” have become generally accepted guidelines
for cooperative enterprise around the world (sometimes modified for legal or other restraints),
and form the base of cooperative economic theory.
1. Voluntary and open membership
2. Domestic member control
3. Member economic participation
4. Autonomy and independence
5. Education, training, and information
6. Cooperation among cooperatives
7. Concern for community (Riverwest Public House Cooperative Board Manual 4-5;
Williams 12; Zeuli and Cropp 9)
These values reflect a cornerstone of cooperative identity: a tangible demonstration of
compassionate concern and a balance between community, member involvement, and profit. In
addition to civic concern distinguishing cooperatives from conventional ventures, cooperatives
potentially offer a sustainable business model based on reciprocity between business and
community (ica.coop; Murphy 2011; social.un.org; Williams 2007; Zeuli and Cropp n.d.).

Cooperative Management
Within the bounds of democratic control, a cooperative can be managed in several ways,
including incorporating a hierarchy that resembles a conventional business. The three most
recognized options for management and ownership models are
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Employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)



Worker-owned cooperative



Worker collective (Zeuli and Cropp 37)

As an ownership model, ESOPs may resemble traditional business in that the workers may
institute a traditional managerial structure; ownership may be predicated on the length of service,
hours worked, or other restraints. In contrast, the worker-owned cooperative and worker
collective have workers at the center of management directly controlling the business.

Worker-Owned Cooperative
In a worker-owned cooperative, the employees legally own the business, but only
employees are allowed to be members (newerawindows.com; isthmuseng.com; cultivate.coop).
Isthmus Engineering and Manufacturing (IEM) is one example of a widely successful workerowned cooperative (Billeaux et al. 2011).
Worker cooperatives are a cooperative in which the members are the working
staff. Management decisions are made democratically: one member-one vote.
Each member shares in the responsibility of managing the business.
isthmuseng.com
A recent study concluded:
IEM, as a worker-owned cooperative, has not only been successful in surviving in
a high-technology industry for over three decades, but it grown [sic], recorded
stable revenues, and has provided competitive incomes for its employees.
(Billeaux et al. 3)
The success of Isthmus Engineering and Manufacturing in a struggling field demonstrates how
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democratic control is a viable structure in a highly technical, competitive business.

Worker Collective
Another type of cooperative management is the worker collective. A collective is a group
without a hierarchy (cultivate.coop). A worker collective, then, is a group of workers functioning
without hierarchy. Like a worker cooperative, employees jointly make decisions about the daily
operations of the business. Zeuli and Cropp describe worker collective management.
The term collective in this context refers to a management style rather than an
ownership model. Thus, a worker-owned cooperative can also be a collective.
Collectives are managed by the entire membership instead of a select membership
team; they have a flat management structure rather than a hierarchal one. (37)
Collective organization is a form of management that does not necessarily rely on a general
manager for direction, discipline, or daily operations of the business. Although the workers
themselves may appoint a manager, this structure is not imposed, but would necessarily have to
arise from the workers and be responsible to the workers (“Job Descriptions”). In addition,
because the manager was elected rather than appointed from above, the manager answers to—
and may be relieved by—the other workers. Cooperators call this reciprocity: “managing the
manager” (Patty2). This reciprocity in effect neutralizes the asymmetrical power dynamic in
worker-manager hierarchies because the workers are able to exert some control over
management—in theory, and in actuality (see Vignette 1; Longo 80; Winsor Writing Power 7).
Membership in the collective grants the worker decision-making power. Unlike

2
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conventional firms where decisions are made by a handful of qualified individuals, with or
without feedback from the employees, in a collective, each member is expected to fully
participate and decisions are made by the group. This act demonstrates that worker autonomy
and valued labor are driving principles of worker collectivity (Riverwest Public House
Cooperative Bylaws 2011). The values and operations of a worker collective are a stark contrast
to the operations of top-down management, what Drucker calls a “command-and-control model
that business took from the military 100 years ago” (3). Power and hierarchy in this commandand-control model have historically been the main concern of professional and technical
scholarship.

An Evaluation of Power and Hierarchy in Conventional and Cooperative
Firms
Authority is whatever makes people obey. -Hannah Arendt
A Foucauldian analysis of power in an organization asks “how” rather than “who” or
“why,” and views power as a set of relations—however unequal—existing as a web or network,
and not as an object or force any one person can possess (Herndl and Licona 2007; Winsor 2003,
2007). Professional communication scholarship has long deployed a Foucauldian lens when
examining power (Henry 2010; Longo 2000; Clark 2007; Winsor 1993, 2003). Using this lens,
Winsor writes that in hierarchical companies, power is never distributed equally.
The uneven distribution of power is not due to individual heroic accomplishments
that result in merited differences. Rather it is accomplished in the systematic use
of sociotechnical means, including generic texts… that slip unnoticed beneath the
surface of everyday life… [P]ower is constructed in the trivialities of everyday
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life that are so taken for granted as to be transparent to us. (155)
Power is best understood as a set of relations, and understanding power as a relation resists
positioning it as an object that can be possessed. Instead, power rests at an intersection of several
different practices. This change in view from power as a possession to power as a node in a
network also shifts the way we think about agency.
If we understand power as a set of relations… it no longer requires that we
connect it to an autonomous individual. So, too, with agency. It does not reside in
a set of objective rhetorical abilities of a rhetor, or even her past
accomplishments. Rather, agency exists at the intersection of a network of
semiotic, material, and yes, intentional elements and relational practices. (Herndl
and Licona 137)
Like Herndl and Licona, Winsor, and Longo, Russell dismisses the notion that power can be
possessed or that it flows through a system. Instead, for Russell, it is mediated and localized.
Power appears in specific, locatable occasions of mediated action and is created in
the network of many localized instances. It is not an inchoate climate of force or
terror, although such atmospheres are (re)created by the operationalizing of
specific actions in mediated activity systems. (524)
How does power operate through a collective? What does agency look like? Without a set of
firm bureaucratic structures in place, the habitus of subordination and command, the religion and
mythos of authority empowering a manager and ensuring obedience, how does power operate
without clear-cut networks (Arendt 1961; Rinehart 2006; Zuboff 1988)? If power is a set of
relations at the “intersection of a network of semiotic, material, intentional and relational
practices,” then perhaps within a structureless organization relying on social contracts between
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players (Freeman 1), social capital gains primacy. By means of tools like genres and other
symbolic power, access to established authorities like founders, demonstrations of commitment,
and even proximity, certain people establish relations that empower them more than others. In
such an environment, the kinds of social conditions that matter might include


Longevity of service



Time on the job and the visibility and articulation of that work



Leisure time to devote to the business



Access to authorized representations



Access to the elected leaders or becoming an elected leader themselves



Access to meetings, both formal and informal



Visible articulations of intellect, wealth, and education



Gender, race, and class, according to the bias of the group



The ability to operationalize on the rhetoric of empowerment.

Without the bureaucratic structure of a hierarchy, perhaps these practices create the conditions
for power and can become embedded in the genres they produce (Arendt 1961; Freeman 1970).
At question is how authority works, including who has authorized textual access, within an
organization that is supposedly flat. Mirroring traditional organizations, some mechanisms seem
to authorize some actors over others. Arendt writes, “Authority precludes the use of external
means of coercion where force is used, authority itself has failed. Authority, on the other hand, is
incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process of
argumentation” (2). This section compares and contrasts manifestations of power and hierarchy
in cooperatives and conventional organizations through rhetorics of empowerment and the
mechanisms of surveillance at work in an ostensibly democratic workplace.
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Rhetoric of Empowerment
One example of how power works in collective management is through rhetorics of
empowerment. Although it has not been studied in a cooperative, professional communication
has long analyzed the instantiation of rhetorics of empowerment, its pervasiveness, and the
resulting re-investment of worker capital. Clark defines empowerment as broadly including a
“sense of the reward system afforded by the job, personal autonomy, pay, benefits, the ability to
choose tasks and structure one’s day, and the value placed on work by colleagues” (161).
Rinehart, Clark, and Cheney’s work support the idea that “empowerment” includes some sort of
control over their work, including the “intensity and duration,” and the “ability to define the
manner in which work is organized, divided and allocated…” (Rinehart 12; Cheney 5; Clark 169,
171). Narratives of empowerment that promise autonomy, like those researched by Clark,
contrast Cheney’s definition of workplace democracy.
A system of governance which truly values individual goals and feelings (e.g.,
equitable remuneration, the pursuit of enriching work and the right to express
oneself as well as typically organizational objectives (e.g., effectiveness and
efficiency, reflectively conceived), which actively fosters the connection between
those two sets of concerns by encouraging individual contributions to important
organizational choices, and which allows for the ongoing modification of the
organization's activities and policies by the group. (5)
Empowerment and workplace democracy have two facets: the narratives and the actualization.
Rinehart, Cheney, and Clark have critiqued narratives of empowerment as potentially
disempowering workers. Clark’s critique asserts that the rhetoric of empowerment may be
operationalized to actually require more work, especially managerial work, without the social,
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economic, and other work-related rewards of managerial work.
In the past, rhetorics of empowerment have taken varying forms. Rinehart and Cheney
have both critiqued worker councils in which companies organize workers on a council as a way
of providing some input, however limited, to the owners and managers. Similarly, the “Quality
of Work Life” movement in the 1970s emphasized individual participation and cooperation.
Rinehart argues these management-worker innovations and “empowering” work movements
were a way to placate employees without giving them real access to influence (Rinehart 49; see
also Cheney 5; Zuboff 241-242). He further argues workplaces’ reformation toward participatory
management or including workers on management councils (or even ESOPs) were a way to
mollify workers, to “circumvent genuine unions” or other democratic mechanisms (49). Of this
very issue, Shaila Dewan recently wrote in New York Times Magazine:
…a workplace doesn’t have to be managed by committee in order to channel
more of the capital share to labor. Workers can just be given stock… But even
this can be just another management strategy to harness the increased productivity
that, studies have shown, accompany employee-ownership and profit sharing.
(2014)
A rhetoric of empowerment, including ESOPs, can be a powerful tactic used by management to
extract more from workers (Dawan 2014; Logue and Yates 2001).
Examining the promise of narratives of empowerment from a position of democracy and
empowerment, Cheney provides a useful heuristic that locates democratic empowerment as
delimited and defined by three factors.
1. The range of issues treated in a particular program
2. The extent of actual influence by employees
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3. The highest levels at which influence is exercised (13)
For example, a worker’s council may have access to a broad range of issues and some actual
influence, but may only exercise that influence on the lowest levels of a corporate structure, or
may provide council, but not actually influence change. This rubric will be useful later on in my
project as I try to quantify the empowerment of workers in the Workers Collective. The
pervasive and penetrating influence of rhetoric of empowerment in the cooperative structure
goads the worker or volunteer under the auspices of a higher calling of “democracy” and
“autonomy.”
Due in part to cooperatives operationalizing their own unique rhetoric of empowerment,
many studies point to worker-run businesses having a higher level of productivity than a
traditionally run business (Craig and Pencavel 1995; Doucouliagos 1995; Fakhfakh, Virginie and
Gago 2009; Rinehart 2006). Despite the comprehensive studies of the rhetoric of empowerment
in conventional businesses, the potential for capitalizing on the rhetoric of empowerment for
greater expenditures of labor does not stop there. The possibility of exploitation of workers
within a cooperative is evident in Rinehart’s description of worker cooperatives.
Despite the failures, worker cooperatives often have excellent results in terms of
normal criteria of business success… If sales drop, workers take pay cuts and
collectively reduce their working hours. One economic advantage enjoyed by
cooperatives is that workers’ commitment and diligence is high. This produces a
second advantage: less supervision is needed than in conventional firms. (211)
Though arguably a cynical view, there is a possibility for exploitation of such commitment,
especially if the position is already a low paying job, as is the case with many service industry
cooperatives like the one I studied.
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Because of this commitment and the desire for consent and unanimity, the rhetoric of
empowerment is a feedback loop and a powerful management tactic weaved into the narrative of
the cooperative, enabling and constraining workers (Foucault 1979; Longo 2000; Winsor 2003).
While Clark, Longo, Winsor, and others have not yet covered collective management or worker
cooperatives, Clark provides a useful heuristic for investigating power/empowerment in co-ops.
In Clark’s essay, the habitus-hierarchy dialectic provides the potential for empowerment.
Habitus is “the set of durable dispositions inculcated in the subject by her past experiences, and
these dispositions adjust the subject’s rhetorical actions to the continually changing situation.”
(Bourdieu 53, quoted in Herndl and Licona 138). The dialectic between habitus and hierarchy
mediated through a rhetoric of worker empowerment in the cooperative model may actually
disempower workers. In other words, if there are no mechanisms to address dysfunction or to
ensure accountability or transparency, or if the power to remove an ineffectual employee is
diffused among many workers, some of whom have competing interests, the goals of worker
empowerment may fall short (Clark 2006; Freeman n.d.).
Clark points to narratives of empowerment as “regulated information access, but also by
position, education, profession, and the solidification and dissolution of organizational networks”
(155). As Clark talks about new technologies in our culture sold using narratives of
empowerment and democratization (157), so cooperatives have their own rhetoric of
empowerment and democratization, operationalized to gain consent from the workers. The story
here is changed only slightly. Just as a conventional workplace can deploy a rhetoric of
empowerment to convince employees to take on managerial tasks (and the accompanying
mechanisms and technologies that control that influence), cooperatives can do the same, but
without the incentive of financial rewards (Clark 156). In a worker cooperative where
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responsibility is diffused among a group, the few with a little more power than others (discussed
later) can operationalize this narrative to gain consent and/or unanimity. From bylaws to worker
protocol documents to PR and marketing materials, texts reinforce the narrative that at a
cooperative, employees are more empowered, simultaneously selling the cooperative ideas to
both the workers and the public, while encouraging workers to take on more to maintain/support
that empowerment, without financial rewards, as Rinehart, Cheney, and others have pointed out.
The cooperative structure, often under collective management, demands and receives a
higher member and community investment in place of traditional capital investors. As a business
that commonly eschews traditional debt, community investment is key to the economic success
of this business and of cooperatives in general (Williams 2007; Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). Murphy
states this community investment is fundamental to the economic viability of the cooperative.
…[C]o-ops with strong early-membership bases often have the support of the
community and loyal clientele that keeps them in business for a prolonged period
of time. Co-ops without this fundamental asset do not open for business at all.
(19)
Therefore, beyond a leftist curiosity, the prosperity and continued success of a worker-run
business can add to workplace communications unique examples of collective management: the
activity of ongoing negotiations without a centralized structure, which includes a rhetoric of
empowerment and operationalizing consent of the Collective. A study of their communication
practices—the successes and the disruptions—could add to and possibly reconfigure what we
think about typified group communication and recurrent empowerment narratives, how workers
communicate with each other to monitor and maintain power and to ensure productivity.
An investigation into the productivity and economic success of a deliberately democratic
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organization could be beneficial for business research in gaining an understanding of the
relationship between hierarchy, capital, and worker productivity. How the cooperative model is
gaining ground in a tough economy when it demands more capital from its members and the
surrounding communities while demanding more of its workers for lower wages could inform—
and possibly reform—professional communication to consider models that are more deliberately
democratic (Murphy 2011; Williams 2007; ica.coop).

Democracy under Surveillance: Cooperative Management and Mutual Monitoring
The seventh Rochdale Principle prioritizes a concern for the community (Williams 2007;
Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). However, despite good intentions, cooperative management may fall into
some of the old Taylorist narratives and management strategies. Rinehart suggests that due to
market forces, a cooperative can come to resemble a conventional business, propelled solely by
profitability despite its democratic nature.
Profitability has to be an essential criterion of operating the business, and this
exerts a powerful influence on the policies and operations of worker-owned firms.
Consequently, the technology, division of labor, and work procedures of workerowned enterprises come to resemble the structures that prevail in capitalist firms.
As Marx recognized, “The co-operative factors of labourers themselves represent
with the old form the first sprouts of the new, although they naturally reproduce,
and must reproduce everywhere in their actual organization all the shortcomings
of the prevailing system.” (Marx 440, qt. Rinehart 212)
After all, cooperatives—like all movements and institutions—are built from the available models
and tools (Polletta 221). In the case of an alternative business model, there is a limited repertoire
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of management strategies from which to choose.
Cooperatives often have explicit hierarchies. Each cooperative has a Board of Directors,
employees (or volunteers), and owners. In the case of a worker cooperative, the employees are
the owners and may sit on the Board of Directors. Wisconsin law dictates that each cooperative
must have a Board of Directors in correlation to its member base (Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). A
cooperative can resemble a conventional business with its goals balanced with a clear dedication
to democratic control by its members.
A similar system of surveillance and control that underpins conventional firms is intact and
operational in many collectives and worker cooperatives alike. Collectives utilize shared
supervising, relying on group norms, internalization of rules, and vigilance for deviation of
norms and etiquette set by the group (Polletta 16). In a worker collective, the mechanism of
observation and mutual reporting often remains intact, but with a plan for substitution in case the
management system breaks down. This substitution could be a human resources committee, a
trusted member of the cooperative or community, or a Board of Directors. Cheney and Billeaux
et al.’s research on democratic management shows how collective management adopted similar
systems of surveillance and, removing the management gaze, dispersed it into a crowd of
observers.
Among cooperatives, this dispersal is sometimes called mutual monitoring (Billeaux et al.
2011; Cheney 1995). Cheney describes mutual monitoring as “looking over each other’s
shoulders, group observations,” or in a leaderless group or group without an outside supervisor,
“group members can develop an internal system of discipline that involves a great deal of
monitoring of one another and a corresponding loss of individual autonomy” (9). The efficacy of
mutual monitoring is evident when comparing a conventionally structured business’s operation
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of panoptic observation to IEM. From Billeaux et al.’s case study on IEM:
It cannot be overstated that the cooperative structure of the firm has a major
impact on how employees experience their work. They consistently pointed out
absence of hierarchy. There is no particular person within the firm to whom they
must answer, who is continually compelling them to work, and who has the last
word on project designs. Instead, they pointed to self-motivation and mutual
monitoring as the most important incentives to work, as opposed to being “under
the thumb” of management. (10)
Under a cooperative structure like IEM, worker productivity, discipline, and timely action are
supervised through mutual monitoring, rather than by an overseer or the internalization of rules.
A collective by definition is antithetical to a formalized hierarchy. However, a collective
also has the potential to be appropriated for undemocratic purposes. For example, an informal
hierarchy may take shape. In fact, Freeman writes the lack of clear structure opens a vacuum for
elites, “stars,” and friend groups to take power over the rest of the group. Freeman seems to
agree with Fagle’s above definition of hierarchical advancement as a fundamental human
motive, inescapable even in the most “structureless” organization (1) and Kastelle says operating
without hierarchy can be difficult and seemingly impossible. In “Tyranny of Structurelessness,”
Freeman criticizes the structurelessness and seemingly flat structure of the second-wave feminist
movement (1970). Freeman argues that the structurelessness of many in second-wave
consciousness-raising and action groups actually created a vacuum that allowed a small
privileged group to gain power without the checks and balances of a formalized structure.
A “laissez-faire” group is about as realistic as a “laissez-faire” society; the idea
becomes a smokescreen for the strong or the lucky to establish unquestioned
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hegemony over others. (1)
This habitus-hierarchy dialectic could result in an imbalance of power, settling social capital in
the hands of a few “stars” or “friend groups” (Freeman 2) to do what could be called the “heavy
lifting” of the group, but without the mechanism of oversight.
Decisions can be made outside of meetings in a social setting, seemingly as harmless as
sitting around having beers and hashing out the topics or issues that the business has been facing.
These discussions may happen informally as business comes up in discussion among friends.
Solutions can be thought up together, but only with the input of this particular friend group.
People who are not a part of this friend group can be felt “swept up” by the majority or friend
group bloc. In this way, consent of the whole collective and, in a sense, the democratic goal of
the group is side-stepped (Freeman 3; Polletta 140, 166-167).
This affinity dynamic is actually complex—and Freeman acknowledges this complexity—
because the affinity group can act with expediency and swiftness with productive problemsolving discussion (albeit, with fewer members). Relying on larger group discussion to solve
problems can be a difficult, tedious, and unreliable process especially with people who are new
or unknowledgeable about business, people with their own agendas or grudges, etc. (Freeman
1971; Polletta 2002). This friend-group problem solving is streamlined and efficient, able to keep
up with the speed of business and the daily, real demands of management. It might be discovered
that friend groups are necessary in order to run a business efficiently. As we will see later, an
unchecked collective of people can form cliques or hierarchies within an ostensibly democratic
workplace and this affinity dynamic can become written into the very governmental texts they
produce. The tension at the heart of this structure is part of a larger discussion between
participatory democracy commitments and the need for practical strategy (Polletta 2002).
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Collective management is unique because democratic control necessitates negotiation and
deliberation, in contrast to businesses built around maximum efficiency and profit, where
democratic control could slow down the process.

Overview of the Project
Research Questions
The main purpose of my project is to find out more about the kind of genres cooperatives
employ and how these genres mediate change in the cooperatives. I argue the Public House is
rhetorically constructed and reconstructed by ongoing negotiations among stakeholders, and
strengthened by narratives of democracy and empowerment. These negotiations are mediated
through tools including email and SMS, incorporating and supporting an atmosphere of
democracy and consent—a key value of the cooperative—while ensuring work is done on time
and within budget. This ongoing mediation is key to the enrollment of actors as well as gaining
and retaining consent and unanimity of the Collective.
My study was guided by the following questions on what collective management can offer
professional communication scholarship.
1. How does a cooperative employ genres differently?
2. What do these texts tell us about how power is distributed in a cooperative?
3. How do the genres it employs affect organizational change?
Focusing on these questions will help me understand the configurations of power at this site.
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Dissertation Chapters
2: Research Design and Methodology
I explain why conducting a qualitative case study is the best way to investigate collective
management and communication practices, and to address my research questions. I provide my
rationale for the study design and methodology, and describe my role as the participant/observer
and someone who plays multiple roles in this research site.

3: Rhetorical Construction of the Public House
I begin to answer my research questions as I examine how the Public House is
constructed rhetorically through tight networks of people and the genres they created and
employed. I argue for a profound contradiction between values and practice.

4: Dream and Death of a Dream: Rearrangement of an Organization through Rhetorical Strategy
I examine the transient nature of the Public House. Looking at unifying documents created
at different points in time, I trace organizational changes and the narratives that facilitated those
changes. Because people involved had direct access to governance, they could pivot in a very
short time. This unfettered access resulted in a nimble, responsive organization.

5: Conclusion: Implications for the Field
I conclude this project by considering the implications this project could have on the fields
of professional communication and cooperative development. I also suggest implications for
actor-network theory and genre theory. I conclude with a look toward future research projects.
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology and Methods
In the last chapter, I provided an overview of cooperative and traditional businesses,
explored some areas of contrast or similarities between them, and established the problems of
assumptions in professional communication research. Emerging theories point to the need for a
new model for understanding communication in horizontal organizations. In this chapter, I will
explain why the best way to study collective management and communication practices—and to
address my research questions—is to conduct a qualitative case study. First, I offer an overview
of my research site and my research questions, hypothesis, and rationale for the study design and
methodology. Second, I clarify how I addressed the criteria for judging the quality of research
design―construct validity, internal/external validity, reliability. Finally, I address my role as the
participant/observer, and as someone who plays multiple roles in this research site.
The aim of this project was to identify the complexities of collective management at the
Public House, how negotiations of power occur, their effects on productivity, and how and in
what ways communication tools are appropriated in the negotiation process. To conduct
systematic research, data collection, and analysis, I employed actor-network theory and genre
theory to analyze organizational communication and productivity within the Collective and the
Board against the backdrop of day-to-day operations.

Research Setting
An analysis of the strengths and limitations of collective management within a successful
cooperative would benefit professional communication scholarship by adding an understanding
of the practices of a model with limited investigation to date. The prime setting for my research
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was Public House, a collectively run, cooperatively owned bar in the working-class
neighborhood of Riverwest in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Wisconsin has the legal and political infrastructure, the financial climate (Williams 2007;
Rinehart 2006; Lawless and Reynolds 2004), and deeply rooted cultural leanings to support
cooperatives. Wisconsin has been an epicenter of the labor movement and the cooperative
economy, in the form of agricultural, health, and consumer cooperatives, for decades. Wisconsin
passed its first cooperative law in 1887, but in 1911, it passed a comprehensive bill that has since
been copied by many other states (Zeuli and Cropp 25). This statute, Chapter 185, outlines the
legal and financial obligations for cooperative operation including responsibilities to members,
and gives affordances to cooperatives as a legal business under governmental purview. Because
of this infrastructure, Wisconsin is home to many cooperatives including agricultural, health
care, food, service industry, distribution, and housing cooperatives.
With a population of 13,065 (“Riverwest neighborhood in Milwaukee, Wisconsin”),
Riverwest is a small, diverse neighborhood situated between Capitol Drive on the north, North
Avenue on the south, Holton Street on the west, and the Milwaukee River on the east. Riverwest
is home to many grassroots neighborhood events like large street and music festivals, a 24-hour
DIY bike race, public theater performances, a free night school, a community nurse, a non-profit
community newspaper, after school programs, victory gardens, a large solar funding project, a
community-run radio station with all original content, and a community free space. Due to
cooperative support on the state level, a higher than average education (“Riverwest
neighborhood in Milwaukee, Wisconsin”), and the existing energy of community spirit,
grassroots activism, and a DIY habitus that could be described as “progressive” or “radical,”
Riverwest is uniquely home to more cooperatives than an average neighborhood, including
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Riverwest Co-op and Café



Riverwest Bakery Co-op



Eight Limbs Housing Cooperative



People’s Books Cooperative



Riverwest Investment Cooperative



Riverwest Yogashala



Riverwest Public House Cooperative



Outpost Natural Foods



Milwaukee River Advocates

The Riverwest Cooperative Alliance (RCA) is a new cooperative that views itself as an umbrella
organization that supports and starts more cooperatives. A self-described “co-op of co-ops,”
RCA capitalized on the ruling of Citizens United, which affirmed the legal personhood of a
business. In this case, the businesses themselves become members of a larger cooperative. The
website describes the group as a “cooperative alliance of organizations dedicated to fostering an
equitable and democratic economy in the Riverwest Neighborhood of Milwaukee, Wisconsin”
(“Riverwest Cooperative Alliance”).
In a community with dozens of cooperatives, Public House is a prime location because it
is relatively new (less than three years old at the time of writing) and because it operates as one
of three cooperatively owned bars in the country (at the time of writing). That this type of
cooperative is less common but growing means that there are few extant structures from which to
draw up the business. Most of the Public House practices, like many cooperatives, are emergent
and contingent, heavily reliant on experts and seasoned “cooperators” in the group. These
features are key to serving communities and to the cooperative’s survival.
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The Public House has a two-tiered pyramid structure. The top tier consists of memberowners, individuals who have bought into the cooperative by paying a fee of either $40 annually
or $200 for a lifetime membership (or five years of consecutive membership) (“Membership”).
Membership benefits—some of which are dictated by state law—include participating in
member-only events and voting in elections (“Membership”; Zeuli and Cropp n.d.). The second
tier consists of the Workers Collective and the Board of Directors.
The Workers Collective, a collective of employees and contractors including bouncers,
bartenders, an inventory coordinator, an events coordinator, and a finance team, manages the
Public House. The Workers Collective is responsible for the daily operations of the bar including
hiring and training, inventory, and event planning. In addition to working closely with memberowners and the community, the Collective reports directly to the Board of Directors. The
Workers Collective may elect team leaders.
The Board of Directors is a group of nine members democratically elected by co-op
members in a ballot vote. Wisconsin law dictates its existence and responsibilities, as the Board
is legally responsible “for the co-op’s continued viability” and is accountable to the memberowners (Zeuli and Cropp 50). In addition be being formally accountable for the actions of the
cooperative, the Board oversees the Workers Collective (Riverwest Public House Cooperative
Bylaws 2011).
Though the Board of Directors shoulders the burden of legal responsibility, the bar
operates exclusively by collective management. That this style is effective is especially curious
given the scale of the operations and events workers accomplish via negotiation, from at-capacity
member-only events to hosting important speakers, politicians, and music groups. Last year, the
bar was named the second best music venue in Milwaukee, over-taking single-owned
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establishments that have been operating for much longer. Additionally, the bar supports a full
bartending, cleaning, auxiliary, and door-tending staff and continues to be economically selfsufficient, avoiding traditional debt.

Design of the Project: Methodologies
Given the unique distribution of power at the Public House, I need to use nimble and
open methodologies and methods. They also must allow for fluctuation, system analysis, and
textual analysis. Both actor-network theory and a social theory of genre meet these conditions.

Actor-network Theory
Because the Public House deliberately functions as a horizontal network with a range of
actors including people, texts, a physical location, disease, organization charts, etc., actornetwork theory is well suited for this project. Actor-network theory is popular in the humanities
and social sciences as a way to account for durability and stability in assemblages (Latour 1991).
In actor-network theory, these assemblages are made of humans and nonhumans, who play a part
through acts of delegation and enrollment (Latour “Where” 177). Latour argues that one way
nonhuman actants participate in our lives is by disciplining us to act or refrain from acting in a
certain way. Through an act of substitution, “a delegated nonhuman character” would ensure a
certain task is completed (“Where” 157). For example, a pneumatic door-closer shuts the door
behind us to ensure a door is closed (but not slammed). Actor-network theory is one way to
explain “how stability and domination may be accounted for once non-humans are woven into
the social fabric,” (Latour “Technology" 103). The inclusion of nonhumans in its analysis is a
hallmark feature of actor-network theory, a way to “challenge assumptions about social context
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of machines,” these actants who are a part of our daily experience, who co-constitute our lives
and our work (“Missing” 153). For Latour, discipline occurs through these acts of substitution:
“…every time you want to know what a nonhuman does, simply imagine what other humans or
other nonhumans would have to do were this character not present” (“Where” 155).
Actor-network theory has been used appropriately to analyze communication systems.
For example, in “Who Killed Rex?” Spinuzzi hybridized actor-network theory and rhetorical
analysis to analyze telecommunication systems, using an approach that is both “political and
rhetorical” and includes looking at the “political/rhetorical movements of complex
heterogeneous networks” (“Who” 50-51). Like Spinuzzi, I splice actor-network theory with
rhetorical analysis: careful consideration of the content of the enrolled texts and the connections
between the texts and participants, for an analysis that is flat, inclusive of nonhuman agency, and
political/rhetorical. As actor-network theory is intentionally apolitical, this hybridization creates
a productive tension between the two approaches. I believe using a modified actor-network
methodology that allows for rhetorical analysis will enable me to understand not only processes
of delegation, enrollment and translation at work in Public House networks, but also the political
and rhetorical nature of the texts themselves.
Actor-network theory is radically symmetrical. Rather than human-centered theory,
which places a premium on human agency and activity, actor-network theory supports a broader
examination of actors—both big and small—and is useful for analyzing and understanding the
networks that support an organization, itself a network and an actant (Latour 1992, 1999; Mara
and Hawk 2010; Spinuzzi 2007). This symmetrical, non-Cartesian approach is sometimes
troubling for humanists as it politicizes material artifacts, even seemingly mundane texts like
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intra-business communication. This inclusion of mundane texts makes actor-network theory well
suited for a network like the Public House that relies on unifying documents.
Transcription and enrollment are central to many actor-network approaches. Latour, Star,
and Myers are interested in “what it means to be enrolled in a network,” how these “little actors
become big actors” by “translating the interests of other actors and enrolling them,” often
through exchanges of power, money, commodities, obedience, etc. (Myers 12). In the case of the
Public House, that translation of interests can occur at the site of the writer and readers. An
actor-network approach to professional communication that tends to a broader range of actors
accounts for the social, political, material, and economic implications of the network.
For Myers and Latour, discourse is not as a neutral tool, but is a way of understanding and
capturing a moment of reality. Texts are integral to enrolling objects in a network.
Two examples of an actor-network approach to enrollment, on very different scales, are
Latour’s door-closer and the Heysham power station. Myers first uses Latour’s example to show
that both small and large systems operate through the same complex of enrollment and
substitution. Myers sums up Latour’s famous door-closer example:
First, people build walls. But they need doors to get through them. But doors need
closing. They could hire a person, a groom, to do this job. But they delegate this
job to a machine. Now that the machine is broken, a text must be substituted to
enroll the passing door user in closing the door. (13)
On a much larger scale, Myers then demonstrates that the Heysham nuclear power station,
though vastly larger and more complex, relies on the same processes of enrollment and
substitution as the unassuming door-closer.
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The same processes of delegation are going on in the safety system of the
Heysham nuclear power plant. Machines are substituted for humans watching,
texts substituted for humans directing, organizations speak for individuals; the
whole system can be seen as a complex of the human and nonhuman. (14)
Myers states that the plant is not a thing to be represented and separated out from its network,
rather “it is an ongoing process of enrollment and disenrollment” (14). Myers’s description of the
Heysham station accounts for its materiality, its “thingness” that is often lost in social and
cultural studies around the object, as well as for the range of humans and nonhumans. Myers’s
and Latour’s work are examples of enrollment and transcription. Actor-network theory could
help reflect on human-nonhuman interactions at my research site by accounting for the totality of
the material world, rather than focusing solely on the human agent acting in the world.
The fundamental symmetry of actor-network approaches makes it fit well in an analysis
of systems like the Public House, involving humans and nonhumans, including texts. However,
because of its emphasis on materiality and focus on “political/rhetorical movements of complex
heterogeneous networks” (Spinuzzi “Rex” 51), actor-network theory cannot be the only
methodology for my site. In fact, its flatness and wide scope exclude human blame, cognition, or
failure in favor of an ecological view. For an analysis that re-inserts human agency in the story, I
turn to a social theory of genre.

Genres: Stabilizing and Generic
In the case of the Public House, an examination of genres in an actor-network could yield
productive insights into group activities where recurring actions of cooperative management take
place. Winsor invites us to consider “how a heterogeneous assembly of people can agree upon a
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common object and act in concert over time” ("Using” 4). Spinuzzi, Russell, Miller, and Zachry
have examined genre, intertextuality, power, and agency in a variety of sites, but the field has not
seen a genre study in a cooperative, a site of potentially enormous social capital, where genre as
a social action is most poignantly evident, and where one particular text can be imbued with
great stabilizing and norming power.
Group behavior is regulated, at least temporarily, through genres, understood as typified
social responses to typified social situations (Miller 1984; Winsor 2003, 2007). As such, genres
are a stabilizing force or as Catherine Schryer says, “stabilized-for-now” (1994; Winsor “Using”
3). Understanding the social situations genres respond to—and stabilize—is key to investigating
networks of power in an organization, even (especially) one that is horizontal like a worker
cooperative (Spinuzzi 2007; Winsor 2003).
Genres can be an integral part of an actor-network analysis. Spinuzzi weaves together actornetwork theory with activity theory for his analysis in “Who Killed Rex?” Winsor, too, sees the
importance of an analysis of genres in examining systems. She writes, “Because they produce
stable representations of shifting reality, texts are among the tools used both to create common
objects and to coordinate activity over time” (2007, 4). Genres that coordinate the activity of
running the Public House include


Maintaining and controlling inventory, payroll, and finances



Documenting and maintaining security



Controlling and maintaining permits and licensing with the city and state



Contacting members and community partnerships

In addition to enabling an actor-network analysis, a social theory of genre will enable an analysis
of the role of power in collective management. This is important because this project will

52

examine the appropriation of generic workplace genres onto a collective management structure, a
structure necessarily relational and social. Collective management might complicate what we
have assumed about how genres shape roles and maintain subordinate/superior positions (Winsor
2003). Thus, the adaptation of traditional business genres in a non-hierarchical, decentralized
structure might redefine what we think about how business genres order an organization.
One deployment of genre theory is the lens of distributed cognition, knowledge dispersed
among people who enable each other’s work, who “supplement and support” it (Winsor
“Learning” 15). Distributed cognition considers thinking as an act that takes place not
completely inside an individual’s head, but “that is distributed among the individual, other
people, the physical environment, and the tools the person uses, including language and such
language structures as genres” (6). Stabilized-for-now genres are fundamental in systems of
distributed cognition, which Winsor advocates is the rule in workplaces, rather than the
exception (5). In the case of the Public House, examples of distributed cognition include


Measuring how, when, and by whom tasks are completed



Measuring and recording behavior, especially in the case of a violation



Tracking decisions made either by the Workers Collective or Board of Directors



Tracking attendance in meetings



Referring back to bylaws and handbooks

In short, in Bitzer’s terms, texts respond to a rhetorical situation and because these situations are
repeated, a rhetorical response draws on the previous text, and a generic text is developed: “Each
text draws on previous texts written in response to similar situations. Through such interaction of
texts, genres evolve as recurring” (Devitt 338; Miller 1984). A text is understood as generic
when it can be applied to multiple situations, when “[i]t does not seek detailed recreation of the
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original encounter between author and audience; rather it seeks to recreate the symbolic context
in which the act emerged… (27). These generic texts (genres) stabilize relationships and regulate
actions of heterogeneous work groups so they can work together “because texts produce a stable
representation of shifting reality” (Winsor “Using” 3). This is why it matters to study genres:
they are stable representations that people use to regulate each other and nowhere is this feature
more important than in the case of the mutual monitoring that occurs at worker
cooperative/collective sites.
Together, texts interact to create a community. Texts that interact with each other might
be referential, functional, or generic; the subject may not be another written text, but an oral text.
When debating an action, the text, created in collaboration and/or generalized, has authority;
“acknowledging the authority of these texts is a prerequisite for membership in the…
community.” (Devitt 338, 342, 345, 351, 354). Devitt’s research of intertextuality in a tax
accountant firm shows the connected nature of genres in a community.
They form a complex network of interaction, a structured set of relationships
among texts, so that any text is best understood within the context of other texts.
No text is single, as texts refer to one another, draw from one another, create the
purpose for one another. (336)
What Devitt is referring to is “intertextuality,” the interaction of texts “within a single discourse
community, a single field of knowledge, and to enable the study of all types of relationships
among texts, whether referential, generic, functional, or any other kind” (337).
In a cooperative, negotiations of power happen without a centralized authority while
doing business, with a concern for economic viability necessary to survive as a business and to
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fulfill a responsibility to membership. Understanding how genres support this activity will help
understand the dynamic forces of power and change at the Public House.

Participant-Observer
In addition to the theoretical frameworks listed above, my study also draws from an
ethnographic perspective, acknowledging researchers also “participate in the activities they
articulate and in the articulation of those activities” (Clark 164). In my case, my participation is
complicated because I was hired by the Public House and joined the Workers Collective several
years ago. In May of 2013, I was elected by members to serve on the Board of Directors. I am
not now nor have I ever been in any supervisory relationship with any Board or Workers
Collective members because the supervisory relationship is diffused across several people, as is
the practice of mutual monitoring. No one person has real supervisory power over another
(except for an elected bar supervisor, which is in turn regulated by the consent of the Workers
Collective). However, my position in both the Collective and the Board problematized my
relationship with my coworkers and co-directors in two ways. First, they trusted me and my
excitement for the project in its early stages may have encouraged them to share information
with me they may not have otherwise shared. Second, because of my relationship with
coworkers, the fragility of the new cooperative, and the cooperative’s tenuous position as an
alternative economic model, negative critique was difficult at times.
The Public House also benefits from my work on this project by receiving a presentation
and proposal for recommendations on improving workplace communication and other relevant
findings.
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Social Bonds of Participation
To understand how participants related to each other and to the neighborhood, I looked to
Francesca Polletta’s exhaustive study on participation in social movements guided by principles
of participatory democracy, Freedom is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social
Movements. Polletta analyzed the way people worked together to get important tasks done and
make decisions, focusing in part on their relationships with each other in the efficacy of
organizing for change. Her work is useful because personal dynamics are very important in a
worker cooperative. The greatest problem with worker cooperatives and collectives—and the
greatest strength—are the power of personal relationships in the context of a business.
Relationships are the bond in this business, so when a relationship is strained, it can affect the
business.
In a collective with less formal structures, personal relationships play a much larger role
than in a conventional business. Polletta describes these as “relational underpinnings” (18).
Personal dynamics plays a role in any organization, but a bureaucracy may more clearly define
the roles and boundaries of positions. Within a business built on a different kind of social
relationship, eschewing bureaucratic means of authority and leadership, personal relationships
have a greater influence on power.
Polletta writes there are three primary social relations of participatory groups: religious
fellowships such as the Quakers, tutelage as found in SNCC and early civil rights movements,
and friendship as found in SDS and early women’s liberation collectives (2002).
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Table 1: From Freedom is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements. F. Polletta (2002), p. 18

Features
Of
Decision
Making

How Groups
Mitigate
Ineffectiveness

How Groups
Mitigate
Inequality

Religious
Fellowship

Deferential

Acceptance of
authority within
the group

Participants are
equal before God

Tutelage

Guided

Trust in
organizer/tutor

Inequality is
sphere specific
and diminishing

Mutual
knowledge and
trust

Inequality is
counterbalanced
by participants’
potential, as well
as real, skills in
other spheres

Friendship

Informal
and
intimate

Examples Of
Movement
Groups

Potential
Sources Of
Conflict

When Conflict
Is Likely To
Emerge

Pre- and postWorld War II
pacifist
organization
SNCC, SDS’s
ERAP, faithbased
organizing

Resistance to
forging new
bases of
authority

When dissenters
invoke the
dictates of
conscience

Resistance to
specifying the
ends of action

When
movement goals
are unclear

Exclusiveness
and resistance to
formalization

When new
members join or
friendships are
otherwise
threatened.

SDS, SNCC,
women’s
liberation
collectives

On the friendship model in social movements, Polletta writes:
The striking thing about these democracies was the informal quality of decision
making and its intimacy. Discussions were long and spilled out of formal
deliberative settings. Decisions were made by informal consensus and tasks were
allocated or volunteered for on the basis of a combination of participants’
preferences and skills. Often, there was no clear line between allocating and
volunteering for tasks. “You do this, I’ll do that”—was the standard approach.
(19)
Because of the horizontal structure of the Public House, understanding the relational
underpinning of the group becomes very important. In Chapter 3, I argue that the relationships of
the people involved in organizing the Public House match Polletta’s description of a friendship
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model. Her research on the strengths and weaknesses of this model will become important as we
untangle the networks that make up the Public House.

Design of the Project: Methods
Because of the unique setting of the Public House and the theories best suited for this
kind of study, the methods below proved most useful. I observed staff at work with an opening
and closing interview. I studied decision making, accountability, and transparency statements or
questions, as well as information transactions via communications technologies. Data collection
continued for approximately six months and involved these methods for exploring Workers’
Collective communication, training, and practices.

Artifact Collection
In order to understand the kinds of genres the Public House produced and employed, I
collected artifacts from the participants that are related to workplace communication and project
management, collaboration, information sharing, and training. Artifacts included copies of
project to-do lists, anonymized emails, SMS, training documentation, bylaws, handbooks,
inventory lists, event notes, and screenshots. To ensure the privacy of others, participants
redacted artifacts before turning them over to me.
I analyzed the observation, interview, and artifact data using ethnographic methods.


Memoing: Starts with, but is not limited to the extant categories of communication, time
and project management, understanding, relationships, strategy, and training.



Visual representations: Activity networks, resource maps, handoff chains, triangulation
tables, and topsight tables (Spinuzzi 2013).
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Member checks: I circulated drafts to participants for comments.

Textual Analysis
Using professional communication’s appropriation of actor-network theory, I analyzed a
variety of collected texts generated by participants. Though a traditional analysis would include a
variety of nonhumans, for this project I examined the relationships of textual artifacts and
humans, including documents, organizational charts, and images.

Site Interviews
In order to gain insight into people’s motives, histories, and activities at the Public House, I
conducted five-hour long, in-person, open-ended interviews with past and present staff and
members of the Board of Directors. Interviews were audio recorded and analyzed alongside
provided documentation.
Interview participants were chosen if they met at least one of the following criteria.


Employed by Public House for longer than one year.



Involved in some facet of management.



Involved in the early developmental stages of the bar.

Study Timeline
I.

Preliminary Research. I began preliminary research with background reading on U.S.
cooperative theory and history. I focused mostly on U.S. cooperatives because of
similarities in cooperative law and culture (i.e., what is true for a cooperative in Italy's
famed Emilia Romagna cooperatives may not be true for a cooperative in Milwaukee).
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Using internet searches, I collected and reviewed documentation from U.S. cooperative
websites. This stage began prior to data collection and continued throughout my study.

II.

Collection. Stage two included artifact collection, meeting observation, and interviews.
This stage also included deciding criteria for interviews and documentation. This stage
lasted approximately six months.

III.

Analysis. I analyzed collected data using ethnographic methods, visualizations, and
theoretical frameworks: actor-network theory and genre theory, as well as Polletta’s
models of participation. This stage continued for approximately one year.

IV.

Findings. The final stage of this study was writing, revising, circulating, and finally
publishing my findings.

Participants
I divided study participants into three groups according to when they became involved in
the Public House. My project suggests that when a participant became involved is a key
determinant of their experience at the cooperative.
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Table 2: Participant groups

Primary
Involvement

Participant






Group A:
Founding

Group B:
Early Operations

Group C:
Middle/Later Operations

Involved in formulating
original plan and
brainstorming structure.

Involved in the initial
recruitment and/or during
the legitimation with the
city of Milwaukee, and
through opening

Involved after legitimation
with the city

3

Lucas
Sean
Sophia
Will









Levi
Lucy
Patty
Robert
Shawna
Xavier
Emily








Carol
Kyle
Marco
Nadia
Sarah
Dana

Shown in Table 2, participants were grouped according to when they began to be regularly
involved in building the business: attending most of the meetings in a given period, sitting as a
director on the Board or the “proto-board,” or working a weekly shift. Workers Collective rules
state that an employee must be a participating member of the Workers Collective in order to
work more than 12 hours a week. Others may opt-in to the Workers Collective by attending a set
number of meetings on a regular basis (“Introduction to New Hires Presentation” 2012.) Group
A represents those who were among the earliest participants, where the idea for a cooperative bar

3

Name, gender, and other identifying characteristics have been changed.
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originated. Group B became involved after the idea for a cooperative bar had gained steam and
the earliest organizing efforts were underway, including recruitment and advertising.
Importantly, at the earliest stage, the idea of the “Public House” was still very malleable,
even more so than after it became established in the City of Milwaukee’s legal and financial
framework. Establishing and organizing the cooperative were still underway, including licensing,
fundraising, procuring a building, and other activities that must occur prior to opening the
business. Many members of this group participated in transcribing the business through strategic
documents, meeting notes, and, with the City of Milwaukee, licenses and bylaws.
Group C represents the last group that came on board after the building was procured and
the entity “Pubic House” had begun to be established in the Riverwest neighborhood and with
the City of Milwaukee. For them, there was a ready-made structure to inhabit. At the point of
Group C, idiosyncrasies were concretized into practice and had been transcribed. However,
because of document ambiguity and with certain members having almost unfettered access to the
governance structure of the business, we will see that Group C was also able to enact substantial
change at the structural level.

Chapter 3: Rhetorical Construction of the Public House: Access,
Participation, and Contradictions
The Public House was a tight assemblage of texts and human actors; the Public House
formed—and was formed by—networks. That is, rather than an immutable object, the Public
House was in constant flux, recurrently stabilized through temporary links of actors and the
genres they employed. The key to understanding the rhetorical processes and the resultant unique
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configurations of power at this location is to look at the founding network through an
intersection of actor-network theory and genre theory. Actor-network theory is applicable to the
study of communication and governance in a cooperative due to its emphasis and considerations
of acts of enrollment—the ways humans and nonhumans work together to accomplish tasks and,
importantly, build or break linkages. As actor-network theory enables an ecological approach to
communication and political disruption at the Public House and incorporates both human and
nonhuman agency, genre theory allows us to follow the texts to better understand not only the
“what” of transcription and enrollment, but the “how” (Latour 1992, 1999; Mara and Hawk
2010; Myers 1996; Potts 2010; Spinuzzi 2007). In this section, I argue that the network was
initially stabilized through genre activity; I show how evolution/dissolution of networks and
genres played a role in creating the tensions between democratic participation and exclusivity
that come to play in Chapter 4.

Founding Network: Stabilized through Texts
In a cooperatively owned business in which group agreements are fundamental to its
viability, genres played a central role in creating and stabilizing the business. Like all
organizations, cooperatives are by nature social structures, built and sustained by human linkages
enrolled together, where stability in the form of either hierarchy or genres are necessary. Despite
the service industry’s high turnover rates and a Board of Directors elected to staggered terms
each year, workplace texts and a constituency of long-term participants stabilized and cohered
the group, establishing genres that outlined group behavior with goals, rules, and roles.
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The Shape of Genres
The initial organizers used many texts to enroll actors into the Public House network in
order to complete tasks, hold the group together, and accomplish their common goal; access to
these texts was key to employing the governing structures touted by the Public House. For
example, one distinct genre organizers have since recognized as essential to the early efforts is a
mind-map of sticky notes. People wrote their ideas for how to structure the business on sticky
notes. Participants grouped similar ideas together. In this way, the group collaboratively
organized the structure of the cooperative.
The use of this tool reflects the grassroots organizing background of the founders, but
also their method of solving conflicts.
…there was one meeting in particular where I facilitated it and came up with a
tool during the meeting to help get us, to help figure out what the structure and
organization of the actual collective and business was going to be. And so how I
lead that meeting was we had a whole bunch of sticky notes and markers and we
had been talking about it for months and so people had this idea in their heads of
how this would work… people just wrote down each component or idea that they
had for the Public House on different little sticky notes. And then we grouped all
of the similar ones together and that’s how we mapped out that we would have a
workers collective and then we’d have membership, we’d have the
publicity/marketing side, which at that point we called propaganda… and the
product of that is how we came up with the manifesto, which was really helpful to
get us all on a similar page. (Sean)
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An interview with Patty reiterated the usefulness and lasting impact of this genre.
There was a time when, we were like, “Okay, what all do we have to do?” There
would be conversation, conversation, conversation… it was frustrating. Sean
brought out like big pieces of paper and stuck them on the walls… And started
visualizing it and it was, “That’s how you do this.” Seeing him do that, being able
to, it’s a good thing to learn, when the group’s at an impasse, trying to make
decisions and it’s very clear what decisions need to be made, but how to make
them is unclear, or what they should be is unclear, that exercise of visualizing it
for everyone so that conversation is clearly on a wall. (Patty)
Sean’s collaborative activity is common in grassroots organizing to bring the group into
agreement (see toolsforchange.org). The use of deliberative technologies is common in
facilitation techniques like the Art of Hosting (Sandfort and Quick 5); however, it is unique that
this tool was used to collaboratively make business decisions.
Genres like this organizing tool was essential in the earliest stages of development where
the Public House was a kind of horizontal utopia. Collaborative and participatory, the network
hung together by their enrollments, including the recognition that using Sean’s tool together they
had decided on the structure. While no one individual may have received 100% of what they
wanted in through the process, enough people were satisfied that the group could agree and move
beyond the impasse that Patty and Sean recalled.
The use of the sticky notes and other tools show how genres evolved to create shared
realities to enroll actors and establish links that held the group together (Winsor 2007). Applying
a social approach to genres provides a framework for analysis of the role of texts in this “hanging
together.” That is, looking at genres as social responses to typified social situations that are
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stabilized-for-now shows that the genres they created were a response to the recurring situation
of impasse and stabilized the group for coordinated action (Miller 1984; Winsor 2003, 2007).
Organizational documents like manifestos, bylaws, and codes of conduct steadied the founding
network long enough to open the business.
The texts they created came to serve the group through interpretive processes. Almost as
immediately as they had begun, they realized that though they each started with a dream, it may
not have been a collective, shared dream. As Sean’s tool demonstrates, the genres they created
enabled the group to move past their disagreements and open the business, but these
disagreements did not disappear. Rather, they became embedded in the genres they were
creating, which were in turn enrolled in the founding network.

The Shape of the Network
This founding network of Public House was responsible for imprinting not only the shape
of the organization, but also the kinds of genres they would employ. Human actors in the first
network (Group A in Table 1) were not entrepreneurs or even experienced bartenders. Sean and
Will’s accounts of this network show many of the founding members were community
organizers and their grassroots organizing background influenced the initial strategies for
opening the bar—grassroots broadly defined as people without expertise, organizing from the
bottom-up. That is, rather than starting the business with a conventional strategy of feasibility
studies, market research, and start-up funds, Patty, Levi, Lucy, and Sean each recounted the
earliest organizing texts from the DIY genre: flyering, knocking on neighbors’ doors, word-ofmouth, and personal outreach.
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These earliest organizing efforts showed individuals enrolled into the founding network by
social and political interests, linked through a narrative threading through Riverwest by
neighbors, signs, artwork, meetings, potluck dinners, and other institutions. According to Sean,
from the beginning, “it was more than just opening up a bar... it was this broader goal of using
that to then fund other initiatives, organizations, projects...” That the business would be socially
conscious is significant to understanding the motivations of the original founding group; that is,
they were creating a business founded on a commitment to shared ownership and open,
democratic participation.
These founding volunteers brought a particular expertise in organizing and quickly took on
tasks like fundraising, drafting documents for the city, finding and securing a location, and
capitalizing on volunteer labor. According to Levi and Robert, this social expertise coupled with
their commitment to building a non-hierarchical collective led to a looser structure at the cost of
ensuring certain important texts like employee wage guidelines or procedures were created at the
start or within the first year of operation.
While this co-op eventually opened as the Public House, it was not always sure the new
cooperative would in fact be a bar. When asked about the beginning, Patty said,
…We decided to start a co-op and then we were like, “What kind of co-op?”
What? “I want to start a business? What should it be?” is not a good way to start a
business. Nobody ever in a million years would do that as a sole proprietor… You
would never be like, “I want to start a business, now what should I become an
expert at?”
The organizers initially considered many businesses, including, according to Will, a bakery.
However, Levi and Sean both said that once the idea of a bar was proposed (and the stories are
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contradictory as to who and how it was first suggested) as a “fast way to make a lot of money,” it
took off and other ideas were dropped. Levi, Patty, and Will agree the reason the bar idea took
off was because it could be started with very little overhead beyond rent, licenses, and initial
inventory, whereas a bakery would require significant start-up money for ovens and other
equipment and “could possibly take years to turn a profit” (Will).
Initially, the group of friends used a variety of methods to enroll other actors from the
neighborhood into the Public House network. Sean and Robert referred to the founding network
members as a steering committee while Levi called it a proto-board. Whatever the term, unlike
conventional entrepreneurs, this network did not enroll business experts, but rather invited
residents of Riverwest using several grassroots organizing strategies to fundraise and to gather
participants, publicly marketing their idea that people without expertise could actualize an
organization to their own advantage. For example, Lucy happened to overhear a conversation at
another cooperative in the neighborhood where she was working.
I was working at the co-op in the food cafe at the time… (Sophia) was talking
with someone else who was in the cafe and then she was like, oh yeah we are
starting to talk about opening a co-op bar. And I was like, “Co-op bar? That’s
awesome. When do you meet?” And she said the first meeting is literally the next
day… I thought it sounded interesting and was there to overhear the conversation.
Lucy’s involvement at an established cooperative positioned her as a candidate for enrollment in
the new project. Importantly, she was not asked about her commitment, her skill set, or whether
or not she could make a capital investment into the business. Rather, she was invited to
participate because of her proximity and experience of working in a cooperative. Similarly, Levi
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and his partner were invited to participate because they lived next to a business owned by one of
the early organizers and expressed interest in cooperative development.
Along with invitation, people became involved because of guerrilla marketing. Robert
became interested through a neighborhood poster.
The way I remember first learning about it was through a poster that was just
hanging up on the street… And it was just a call to meet, which I thought was a
really cool thing. Because I love co-ops but also because it was a new thing to get
people into a room. As opposed to a particular kind of targeted invitation or more
formal, that it was informal and everyone was invited.
As these accounts show, the group did not enlist actors through orthodox means—by targeted
recruiting efforts or invitations to experts—but rather through community organizing tactics. The
underlying belief, according to Patty and Lucas, was that experts were not needed, but that
through community knowledge, “looking around,” and “Google searches,” they could locate the
necessary resources and knowledge to open a cooperative. Importantly, posters, often handpainted and tacked to a lamppost or taped in a window, invited a particular type of participant,
one who:


Lived or traveled through the neighborhood on foot, bike, or skateboard (cars would
move too fast to read the sings in the window)



Possessed some experience or interest in cooperatives and cooperative development



Had time or interest in developing a cooperative in the neighborhood

Emblematic of the do-it-yourself focus of the earliest network, these posters resemble advertising
for punk shows or other events scattering the Riverwest landscape. Use of this kind of artifact to
strum up support for the project is an example of how the Public House sought and welcomed a
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particular type of participant—the neighbor and the cooperator—and then together constructed
Public House within the neighborhood of Riverwest. The collected data does not date back far
enough to adequately examine the intention behind early recruiting, but what efforts like the
posters and word-of-mouth point to—at least in these instances—is an early shaping of a
network through targeted enrollment, selective inclusion.
Levi, Lucy, Lucas, Sean, and Patty described the early group as loosely organized, though
not necessarily a group of friends, although there were friends in the group. Importantly, this
group was not a monolithic group, but heterogeneous and linked together for a variety of
reasons, with varying backgrounds and levels of expertise, as well as diverse—and sometimes
competing—goals and motivations. Eventually, these differences grew to manifest themselves in
the texts they produced.

The Myth of the Public House: Exclusionary Practice Meets Democratic
Principles
While the Public House deployed the language of democracy in its workplace documents,
publicizing the workplace as a horizontal, democratic space in which individual autonomy was
encouraged, in practice, this promise fell short for some. In some ways, the organizers fell short
of living up to its promise because of failures in the texts—not necessarily through any one
individual’s fault, but because the nature of the social arrangements present from the beginning
was reified in the texts they produced and the kinds of genres they employed. Interviews,
observations, and analyses show individual predictions and perceptions of the values and mission
fell short of what genres were doing in practice. Meeting notes from a board training session in
2013 put open decision-making at the heart of what made the Public House a cooperative:
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What makes this a co-op?
Member-owned
Participation in governance (expected, and as a benefit)
Decision-making by many, rather than one or a small few
Democratic participation in decision making (Board of Directors)
The capacity to participate in governance was integral to how people defined the Public House
for themselves and marketed it to others. Nevertheless, this broad participation was largely a
myth operationalized to move participants into productive consent, not because of nefarious
aims, but because the relational nature of the Public House led to a lack of formalized
mechanisms which could ensure access.
As in many organizations, workplace genres at the Public House were socially
constructed and continually reinterpreted. However, what made genres at the Public House
unique was that a broader range of a limited subset of actors had textual access to governance;
that is, some individuals freely created and interpreted genres, and this access translated into an
ability to respond to—and even enact—change in the network.
For example, while employed there as a bouncer, I grew unhappy with the position and
decided to propose a new job description with greater responsibilities, while asking for a change
in the wage: from a flat minimum wage to a higher wage, plus a percentage of tips. Using a
traditional business communication genre (a formal proposal), my idea worked its way from an
employee meeting to the Board for approval within a month’s time. My position as an insider
granted me this access and the agency to write and circulate a proposal, bringing about
organizational change. While theoretically, anyone could do the same, my position in the
network created the conditions for me to feel I had an ability or even a right to do so.
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Textual access was purportedly open to all participants. Everyone formally involved
(as employees, long-term volunteers, or directors) had open access to all governing documents—
including all meeting notes—with editing permissions in Google Drive. In practice, however,
fewer had the ability to change systems as the delineations of who could posit change was
unclear in the documentation, instead prescribed by group norms. This is the heart of the
contradiction: while the ability to access governance through genres seemed open to anyone,
genre access was actually limited. Regardless, people continued to share the message of open
governance with new workers upon hire, from the Board of Directors, through literature, and in
meetings (including worker meetings, board meetings, and joint board and employee meetings).
While founders and early employees accessed a robust network of people, genres, places,
governance, etc., outsiders may have found it difficult to affect change. In other words, while
employees, founders, members, and the marketing materials publicized the Public House as a
porous, democratic system in which an individual could “own their work,” newcomers may have
found it difficult to break through. The Public House was a very tight material and textual
assemblage, and for those without access, enacting change—and perhaps meaningful
participation in decision-making—may have been more difficult. If a new employee had
attempted to re-write her job description as I had, she may have discovered she did not have the
same ability to act. In this way, access may have been problematic for newcomers.
As I seek to understand power at the Public House, I turn again to my research questions:
1. How does a cooperative employ genres differently?
2. What do these texts tell us about how power is distributed in a cooperative?
3. How do the genres it employs affect organizational change?
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One way this cooperative employed genres differently is that many people had textual access to
the governance of the business, but only some people. In and of itself, this limitation is not
unique. However, in this case, this limitation matters for two reasons: 1) the Public House
positions itself as an open, democratic workplace where all people can openly particpate; and 2)
people gave up other rewards in exchange for this democratic promise. While deploying
rhetorics of empowerment, the Public House created minimum wage jobs on the basis that
employees would be empowered to shape their job and own the directions of the business. At
times, a contradiction existed between the stated values and the material realization of those
values in individual lives.
The practical limitation of access was a byproduct of the relational foundation of the
network. Understanding how people enrolled in the network related to each other through the
genres they have available or have created will help me to understand how textual access
translated into power, in service to Question 2: What do these texts tell us about how power
distributed in a cooperative organization? This allows me to explore the tension between
democracy and exclusivity: e.g., one way power was distributed was through network positions
enabled and constrained by genre access.
In the sections below, I untangle the founding network—to use Spinuzzi’s metaphor
(2007)—that made up the Public House in order to answer my research questions. First, I
examine how friendship among founders and early members created a stabilized and exclusive
network. Second, I look at an instantiation of their collaboration through genres. Finally, I tangle
the pieces back together to look at the creation of the Public House as an assemblage of these
two conditions.
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Relational Underpinning Affected Textual Access
Understanding how people related to each other will help me to understand how power is
configured through the genres people created. Because an array of actors had access to
governance documents and procedures, how these actors related to each other profoundly shaped
how people accessed the Public House network. Applying Polletta’s theories of participation and
drawing from her examples, I argue the participants at the Public House primarily related as
friends and that the exclusionary nature of friendship was built into the workplace genres they
created/interpreted.
The way people related to each other profoundly affected the way they wrote and used
texts, most notably the lack of formal mechanisms like policies and procedures. In the case of the
Public House, if a friendship model of relationship was baked into the governance structure, then
an already porous structure became even more permeable. There are at least two properties of
this configuration at the Public House: informal, invisible power and the (inadvertent) exclusion
of newcomers.
Baldacchino and Hoffman locate two kinds of power that can operate in a cooperative
like the Public House: informal and formal networks. Hoffman defines formalized power as an
attribute of the job description, easily locatable and delimited.
Formal position attributes characterize a job and its associated activities. Informal
network connections comprise worker-made alliances throughout an organization
(Kanter 1979). For example, position attributes might empower a dispatcher to set
fellow workers’ staffing schedules; network connections might enable a cab
driver to learn the priorities of the as-yet-unwritten monthly agenda. The former is
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overt, easier to identify, and acknowledged by the organization’s members. The
latter is more covert, less obvious, and invisible to some members. (55)
The Public House was made of these informal networks of power with few formalized positions.
Group norms, rather than formalized roles, dictated roles and rules. Some individuals were
empowered to direct operations over others, even while the organization was ostensibly
horizontal. For example, during my study, the mission statement was discovered to have
changed. The change was noticed when the “old” mission statement appeared on an
organizational document instead of the “new.” I could not find records of the re-writing
procedures or conversation. Some individuals felt empowered to take autonomous action, while
others did not, and who could take this kind of action was not outlined in the documentation.
Murphy references to this blurring of lines between autonomous and consensus-based
decision-making in the early meetings of the Public House.
The meetings were pragmatic and featured consensus-based decision making
wherever possible. At the same time, as cooperators assigned duties amongst
themselves, they were explicit in stating that committees and board members
should feel autonomous enough to make decisions that affected the whole
enterprise, and their judgment would be trusted. These dual processes of
autonomous decision-making and consensus-based decision-making were
important to streamline the development of the enterprise. (41)
Murphy mentions the lack of formalizing certain measures and the trust that allowed individuals
to work autonomously: “Interestingly, the cooperators did not discuss in detail what
differentiated an autonomous decision or a group decision, but to my knowledge this did not
cause any problems” (41). The genres they were creating together lacked procedures, not needed
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for people who were mostly friends or at least friendly. This lack of discussion on what
necessitated autonomy or consensus indicates the informality in the network being built into the
genres they produced (18). For example, for most of the Public House’s existence, there was no
employee handbook, or a formal vacation or absence policy.
At an organizational level, while the lack of mechanisms enabled some to act
autonomously, the lack of formalized mechanisms and roles made discipline and accountability
difficult. An example of this difficulty was the failure to intervene in disruptive behavior during
meetings. One meeting I observed became quite heated. Feelings were hurt and the conversation
circuitously devolved into bickering and side talk. People showed signs of frustration like eye
rolling and exchanging glances. One director put her head in her hands (Observation Notes
4/12/14). Disruptions and communication breakdowns like this example were not frequent, but
common enough that it was not an anomaly. Even though this behavior was clearly disruptive to
the group and the majority of the attendees were visibly frustrated, no one individual felt
empowered to stop it. The agency to step into a dispute and disruption to the Board agenda was
missing. Perhaps this absence was because of a diffusion of responsibility, linked in some way
back to the way the group designed their governing texts, lacking formal mechanisms of control
and roles. The deployment of social capital affected the direction of the organization, and, as
shown in the incident above, directly influenced board outcomes.
Employees often relied on their network positions and enrollments to blur the lines of
compulsory action. For example, employees and directors often used the phrase “volen-tell” (to
request someone to volunteer for a task, implying a lack of choice). One example of the volentell network is the organizing of a large event, a Kentucky Derby party. Will asked, “Marco, will
you have it clean and open at 10 am?” Marco says, “Yes.” Someone else asks, “Who is making
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the flyer?” Ideas for the flyer then come from a few different people until the group decides on a
design. A worker asks Dana to design the flyer and the tickets, and then ask the group, “Can you
work a 9-hour shift if you come in at 1? Carol, can you stay late?” While Carol and Dana were
free to say no, the capacity to ask for such a task was an example of unequal power distribution
within the network.
The informal friendship-unfolding of the network resonates with Polletta’s description of
SDS and women’s liberation collectives. Problems that arise because of this kind of power
distribution in the organizations Polletta studies also arise in the Public House. Polletta points to
the primary instability of a friendship basis, which is not that it may be destabilized if friendships
go sideways, but that friendship is necessarily exclusive.
If friendship supplies the trust, mutual affection, and respect that facilitate fast and
fair decisions, it also makes it difficult to expand the deliberative group beyond
the original circle. Newcomers lack an understanding of the history of issues at
stake as well as the idiosyncratic practices of this organization. Veterans may fail
to inform or consult them. But newcomers' lack is affective as well as
informational… they may find it difficult to secure the trust, respect, and
solicitude that veterans enjoy. (140)
The exclusionary qualities of friendship enabled a reliance on unspoken norms and etiquette in
the absence of formalized roles that Murphy references, a quality that can undermine
newcomers’ attempts to gain textual access to governance documents. While the language and
the structures were there, how exactly to act and to access those structures may remain a
mystery.

77

Despite the problems of exclusivity and diffusion of responsibility, after first organizing
around friendship, reorganizing around something more formal can present difficulties, straining
the unique bonds that made the organization successful in the first place, bonds that had become
the foundation of decision-making and agreement (151-152). Difficulty in reorganization
becomes more pressing as organizations grow, founders or experienced employees leave, and
newcomers take their place. As we see in the next chapter, in the case of the Public House, broad
network and generic textual change was possible only through disruption and upheaval.
Polletta suggests that the exclusionary nature of friendship inevitably leads to fighting,
stultification, and inaction (4). As we see in the Public House, the friendship model indeed
precipitated many complications, compromises, and contradictions, perhaps ultimately
undercutting many of the values the business was originally founded on.

Textual Access Affected Participation
One of my guiding questions was to find out how cooperatives employ genres differently
from a conventional business. My study shows that in the case of the Public House, genres acted
both as gatekeepers and as points of access by which some individuals could participate in
governing the business.
According to Winsor, “Texts function not only to record and share what is already known
but, perhaps more importantly, to help writers and readers generate and agree on what counts as
knowledge” (“Learning” 5). In the case of Public House, the question is not only what counts as
knowledge, but also what counts as acceptable practice, how these decisions were made, and
how they shaped the texts created. While many genres and authorized texts were created to fulfill
the requirements of the state, in response to incidents, or to transfer knowledge, they lacked
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official documentation outlining roles and means of decision making. Whatever the reason, by
neglecting to create official mechanisms and texts that formalized how individuals could access
the governance structures, they legitimized invisible, informal power negotiated through group
norms, leaving newcomers and outsiders without access.
During my study, they continually referenced the texts they had created. For instance, I
witnessed more than one occurrence where a member of the board asked what the bylaws say
about a particular issue, and another member pulled them up, looked them over, and read them
aloud to the group. During meetings, volunteers or the secretary took exhaustive, detailed notes
and, post-decision, another member wrote the account in a “Decisions Made” file. These texts
recirculated for other uses as they pointed back to a decision, conversation, or negotiation.
One example of how textual access translated into access to power at the Public House is
the use of Google Drive for note taking. During meetings, people often toggled between Google
Drive and the verbal conversation. I observed more than one instance of participants writing to
each other in the open document or texting about what is happening in the meeting, in private
off-the-record chats. Friends talked to each other and made private observations outside the
deliberations or even the knowledge of the group. Such observations and comments may have
affected actions of the participants without knowledge of the rest of the group, problematizing
the notion of consensus.
This kind of side-chat alongside the authorized conversation was observed on several
occasions. For instance, when the Board decided to fire an individual, Patty and I took notes.
Patty blurted out the person was fired in what I thought was a harsh tone. I typed into the Google
Doc something along the lines of, “Hey, ease up on it a bit” to let him down easy. Patty changed
her behavior—the way she talked to the individual as the voice of the Public House—because of
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my private comment, but no one else at the meeting besides us were aware I had even said
anything. While technically anyone at the meeting could have logged in and participated in the
note-taking, not everyone had a laptop or felt empowered to act. In this manner, access to Google
Drive or group SMS threads enabled collaboration among select people, while those without it
were left with only “authorized” messages.
The incident report is another example of how textual access translated into the ability to
act and affect change. A response to a perceived lack of accountability, the incident report was a
flexible, open document created for reporting events that were deemed unacceptable by a worker
or board member about other workers, board members, volunteers, patrons, or any individual
that came into contact with the bar (Figure 4). The Board of Directors created it in response to a
complaint. The incident report now hangs above the record player, near the laptop, a physical
artifact circumscribing the reporter.
As other genres created at the Public House, the incident report functioned in some ways
like Winsor’s work orders in Writing Power. The incident report was an example of how those
with textual access may affect change. Winsor described how work orders “jointly endorsed
interpretations, came to represent facts” (61). Through the incident report, an event was
rhetorically constructed for those with the capital to act upon it. Notes from the meeting that
resulted in the creation of the incident report show it was created to monitor the bar. The
intention behind the incident report was informative about problems at the bar, including
drunken or disruptive behavior: “We don’t want to have a policy of no drinking at the bar, but
maybe we could put together what we find acceptable... If the WC can’t police themselves,
[then] we are in a funny spot because we are directly responsible for the bar but not day to day
operations.” Also, sound and door workers should be able to make incident reports, that
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“incident report should be anonymous and emailed,” and “stuff people say in community should
also be filed. It should be anonymous, not punitive” (Special Meeting).

Figure 2: Incident Report

Here is an example of a filed report:
What happened?
A large brawl outside of the Public House around 1 AM…

81

Who was involved?
Almost everyone that was inside Public House that night. Nobody is sure how it
started, but it involved patrons, performers, (organizers), and staff interfered

What we did at the time:
Carol, on door, was the first outside to try to diffuse the situation. Sophia and I
noticed upwards of 20 people all exit the bar at once, and Sophia immediately ran
outside while I tended to the bar. I was trying to stop people from rushing outside,
knowing it would escalate whatever situation was happening outside… Sophia,
Carl, and… were outside trying to break up the fight. It was an unmanageable
amount of people. I attempted to call the cops from inside, but our neighbors beat
me to it…

This is what we are going to do:
Sophia, Carol, and I do not want Tuesdays to stop happening. We all think it is
really important to have this type of event at the Public House. We came up with a
few ideas to prevent things like this from happening:

Hold a special meeting with Carl and Mel about why they want to be involved
with Public House. Pinpoint whether they just want it to be a party for them each
week, or if they want to be involved with the community building aspect…
(“Incident Report”)
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By framing the report with blanks for “what we did at the time” and “what we are going to do
about it,” the incident report encouraged participants to narrativize the incident, granting agency
to the individual making the report. The incident report itself listed the Worker Collective
Google group as the intended recipient (a group that the Board of Directors can read and
participate in as well). However, in practice, documents may be emailed to either the Board of
Directors as a whole or to a singular individual perceived to have power to act upon it, typically
a director, but at times, it could be an individual acting in a managerial capacity. The incident
report could have resulted in an investigation leading to disciplinary action, though neither of
these outcomes is prescribed in the incident report itself.
Because no mechanisms existed, individuals in the Collective needed a way for
complaints to be formalized and acted upon. Mutual monitoring (Cheney 1995) necessitated a
transcribed interpretation that could enact a certain event (investigation by powerful individuals).
In lieu of an authorized point person to convey the story, this narrative was necessary to create a
shared reality among those with access to it.
One example of the way an incident report creates a shared reality is when an individual
stole an item from the bar. The security camera video and witnesses recorded the misconduct.
Like Winsor’s work order, it was the incident report that rendered the misconduct material,
translating it to textual form upon which the Board of Directors could act. Once an action was
inscribed, it gained a reality that can be acted upon by the Board (Latour 1999; Winner 1986).
Latour addresses this phenomenon of translation in Pandora’s Hope. He writes:
It seems that reference is not simply the act of pointing or a way of keeping on the
outside, some material guarantee for the truth of a statement; rather it is our way
of keeping something constant through a series of transformations. Knowledge

83

does not reflect a real external world that it resembles via mimesis, but rather a
real interior world, the coherence and continuity of which it helps to ensure. (58)
A chain of enrollments and inscriptions lent reality to a moment that previously no board
member was aware of; it might as well not have existed. However, the word of witness + video +
incident report gave the moment a reality that was hard to ignore. The incident report was a
social action because it inscribed an event, giving the report exigency.
The incident report is one of many genres created at the Public House: a response to a
need. It formalized mutual monitoring into generic procedure and, most importantly, formalized
unequal access to give the report, and to respond to it. The incident report, which I was a part of
creating, was the first step toward formalizing hierarchy at the Public House.

Chapter 4: Dream and Death of a Dream: Rearrangement of an
Organization through Rhetorical Strategy
In Chapter 3, I demonstrated how compromises reified in the texts they produced
together—texts most notable for their lack of prescriptions—opened the way for informal,
invisible power for some and lack of access for others. In this chapter, I continue my
examination of the Public House networks and the genres they instituted, extending my analysis
from the relationships of the founding network to the genres they employed; contradictions and
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tensions present in these original genres erupted into a full re-arrangement of the Public House
network4.
During my study, I witnessed changes that resulted in dramatic alteration of the structure
of the Public House. To patrons and members, it may have appeared as if nothing had changed,
but the organization had changed dramatically over a short period, so much so that the business
may have been unrecognizable to those involved at the beginning. Individuals empowered by
their textual access to governance documents enacted sweeping structural, network changes.
Power shifted, from diffused power enabled by broad-yet-limited textual access, to a
combination of these documents and—most importantly—power became vested in a particular
network position: a manager. That is, rewriting organization documents alone did not resolve
tensions, but rather change came by rewriting genres and by collectively instituting a new
position who embodied this compromise. This change occurred by way of a handful of
empowered individuals with textual access able to enact changes in network articulation, which
resulted in significant philosophical and practical organizational changes, changes that ultimately
brought the organization toward solvency.
Because of the friendship relational model of the Public House covered in Chapter 3,
documentation was informal, lacked protocols, and allowed for wide interpretation of
procedures, opening the way for unequal distribution of power. The documentation the initial
group of organizers produced enacted a compromise from two incommensurable philosophical
perspectives of cooperative development: self-managed collectivity grounded in concern for
autonomy, and procedural accountability grounded in concern for transparency and equitability.

4

Key details of these events have been changed or removed to better protect anonymity and to keep the focus on
structural network concerns, rather than individual actors.
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For example, in order to coordinate varying motives and values around labor, they created a
genre called the Manifesto. At least partially a representation of their negotiation of differences,
the Manifesto helped situate the Workers Collective within the Public House network; however,
the Manifesto failed to resolve the two conflicting positions.
Over time, the incommensurability of these positions developed into a rupture in the
network, near insolvency, and finally, in a moment of top-down authority, a re-organization of
the workers by the Board of Directors. The Board instituted a new managerial position, shifting
the burden of negotiation between collectivity and the need for procedure, from a document to an
individual. This new manager’s first act was to enroll a new prescriptive genre: an employee
handbook, which superseded the Manifesto. Ultimately, these changes led to a showdown
between the two perspectives, dramatized between a stalwart of the collectivity faction against
the new managerial position. In the end, the new managerial model—with a stronger network
and more actors enrolled—won out.
Because of their access to governance, certain empowered individuals could pivot the
business in a very short time. This unfettered access by a few resulted in a nimble organization, a
quality ultimately responsible for its survival, even while compromising original intent of full
democratic participation.

Conflicts in Structuring the Public House: The Manifesto
In this section, I examine the two incommensurable positions on cooperative
development and their disagreements on how the Public House should be structured. In an effort
to reach a compromise and coordinate action, they enrolled a document to concretize their areas
of agreement. Called the Manifesto, this document failed to resolve at least two issues: their
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reliance on momentum and friendship rather than stability, and the problem of the distribution of
labor in the new network.

Foundational Split: Two Perspectives at Odds
The unequal access we saw in Chapter 3 was largely due to ambiguous documentation
lacking formal mechanisms, enabling invisible power networks to flourish at the expense of
access and transparency. Here, I argue divisions in the founding network present at the beginning
were ultimately to blame for this lack of formal mechanisms that allowed exclusionary practices
to be concretized into organizational texts. These divisions were the result of divergent
viewpoints on how the Public House should be structured.
Interviews reveal at least two visions of ethics on structure. The first group of individuals
shared an organizing philosophy rooted in the do-it-yourself culture of the neighborhood. When
asked why more deliberate management mechanisms were not put in place at the beginning of
the bar or why expertise was not sought, Patty ascribed it to a DIY ethic along the lines of
grassroots activism, punk music, basement shows, zines, and anti-consumerism.
The point of anything is to do it. You don’t need to ask permission to do things;
you don’t need necessarily to have any expertise… Coming out of that sort of
cultural space and going into “How are we going to actualize a democratic
economy? What does that look like? Do we need experts? Hell no we don’t.”
That’s the attitude. Like, “Let’s start a co-op. Okay, what kind of co-op? Let’s
start a bar. Alright, let’s do it.”
Robert and Levi agree with Patty when she identified a DIY ethic with an anarchist attitude, the
heart of which is an undaunted belief in self-management. As this DIY ethic is antithetical to
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conventional management expertise, and more in line with anarcho-syndicalist self-management
as discussed in Chapter 1, I will refer to this model for business management as “selfmanagement” for shorthand.
Sean, Robert, Lucy, and Patty also identified a second position was from some of the
people with organizing and/or cooperative experience, who were familiar with the strictures of
running an organization and who had previously helped build or manage a cooperative. This
second position is responsible for what has been referred to by Robert and Levi as “process:”
enrolling into the founding network a range of procedural genres including transcriptions,
organization charts, governance calendars and other texts associated with the formal process and
structuring techniques. Individuals in this group had been involved in a range of organizing
efforts, from environmental and social issues to cooperative info-shops, housing, and policy
efforts. They brought theoretical knowledge and hands-on experience to the foundational
network of the Public House. I refer to this party as “process-oriented.”
Texts created during the founding meetings enacted tensions between these two
approaches. The best example is the text entitled “Manifesto.” By naming it a type of political
declaration in militaristic typeface on the cover, the authors frame their project as political and
radical. A look inside, however, shows a rather conventional business document, save for the
“Propaganda Committee,” a tongue-in-cheek label revealing members saw this document as
promoting a particular political perspective with street militancy.
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Figure 3: Cover of Manifesto
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Figure 4: Table of Contents
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In stark tension to the radicalism conveyed by the cover, opening the Manifesto reveals the Table
of Contents. The reader encounters a conventional, standardized demarcation of topics, structural
and budgetary in nature, documents that enabled the compromise toward collaboration and
coordinated action, according to Sean whose sticky notes tool resulted in the Manifesto.
The Manifesto reified the tensions between the self-management faction and the processoriented faction. Beyond the cover, the document revels what people believed they were making:
a well-organized activist organization for some, and a political DIY project for others. The
resulting document is a compromise between the two.
Interviewees reported some organizers left as the cost of compromise became too great,
but many who were bothered viewed the document as a concession they could work with.
Ultimately, however, it was a fantasy of collaboration. Given the disciplinary problems inherent
in the informal structure and the incommensurability of the two philosophies, noticeably missing
was anything along the lines of regulatory measures, perhaps because discipline was too
contentious of a point and brought to light the ruptures in the framework most clearly, leaving
the organizers unable to reconcile.
In contrast to Murphy’s description of the first organizing meetings (41), Sean, Robert,
and Levi recounted how often the opposing organizers clashed as the self-management
philosophy butted against formalization and implementation of configuring mechanisms. Selfmanagement advocates saw those elements as domestication and contrary to worker autonomy.
At moments of conflict, the self-management group would often win due to vocal and intractable
positions, according to interviews with Sean, Robert, and Lucy. In interviews, process-focused
organizers pointed out times they made concessions in an effort to focus on the necessary actions
at hand, like buying a license, dealing with the property owner, etc. In these moments, practical
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details took precedence over less immediate but perhaps equally important decisions like
attendance policies or consensus process, stances that were, according to Robert, believed to be
contrary to self-management from the start.
Lucy mentions that when tensions rose over an issue not important to you, stepping out of
the way was expedient, but that this giving over allowed for others to control or dominate a
process, ultimately shaping the organization.
I feel like so many people involved are just nice fucking people, not that they
aren’t strong or not willing to fight for shit, but it’s just not worth it to deal with
the negativity and the backlash from standing up to someone. It allows people
who are more controlling to control because the other people are like, “Okay, I’ll
just keep going and deal with my own shit.” When the potential consequences are
nastiness and negativity and it’s something you don’t feel strongly about, it’s just
easier not to participate. The people who are more forceful are the ones who are
going to get their way because the rest of us, while we care, in all these little bitty
things, it’s just not worth it.
About the self-management roots of the Public House and the conflict between process-oriented
people and people less interested or resistant to process, Robert said,
This isn’t an anarchist project, it’s a participatory democracy. I think part of it is
…any semblance of structure or order is the Man, and the idea of being processless and being flexible and rolling with it and it happening in this organic way is a
really great idea, idealistically, but I don’t think that… I think that it is too
important to think about things like safety and respect and inclusion as far as
voices silenced, I think that process is part of the joy of decision making. The
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learning process, the leadership development and all of that, and what I imagine
this anarchist free-form “unprocess” is an opportunity for power to be exerted in
unhealthy ways.
In line with Freeman’s “tyranny of structurelessness” theory, Robert argued “free-form
unprocess” in an organization opening the way for power to be exerted upon others. In reflection,
Robert identified the lack of structure and relationship foundation as a point of weakness.
If we could go back I think we would spend a lot more time preparing a little bit
more infrastructure before opening because I think a lot of the challenges that
have happened at the Public House through its opening has really been focused on
some of that infrastructure not being in place… and folks relying on relationships,
which is important, but sometimes can’t necessarily sustain other kinds of
challenges. And can sometimes be a hindrance to efficiency and process and
success.
During interviews, several participants expressed the belief that the absence of process was
demonstrated by a lack of enrolled texts outlining disciplinary mechanisms, texts that may have
allowed the group to handle personnel problems in a non-reactive way, rather than to address
them ad hoc.
The Manifesto failed to address the tensions it embodied. Below, I show two
manifestations of the rifts the Manifesto failed to address, which precipitated a destabilization of
the network: the reliance on momentum, and the issue of the distribution of labor in the network.
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Reliance on Momentum Rather than Stability
In the heady rush to open the business, details of policies had to wait. A reliance on
momentum rather than organizational genres helped to destabilize the network. Despite tensions
in the network, the Public House opened in less than two years. According to Levi, forward
momentum carried them through early disagreements and philosophical conflict. Levi, Lucy, and
Sean agreed early momentum was spent building a business rather than focusing on process and
structures like how agreements would be made, what constitutes an agreement, and other details;
energy was spent on the short-term goal of opening. For Levi, this focus was a strategic use of
time.
A lot of groups, when you are founding something you are so involved in starting
it up you don’t worry about the process-y things. Which is good and bad. I have
been in groups that tried to do the process-y things and then that’s all you do, you
never actually start anything. Because now we have all this organizational method
for a thing that doesn’t exist yet. Because we never started it. You can spend a
year doing that, or you can spend a year starting something and then realize you
have no process. That can be problematic, but if you started it and then you go
back and make a process, it’s a pain in the butt but you can do it. Whereas if you
have a process and no group, that will fizzle out and then you don’t have a group.
Forward momentum was expended starting the bar, meeting licensing deadlines and other
essential tasks, and not reflecting on what or how internal processes were developing among the
group to create stability.
Perhaps one reason these texts were not created was that, unlike the Manifesto, which
represented compromises on the structure, the divisions on discipline were too deep to inscribe
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compromise. Once this “opening” momentum is spent, fissures that were already present began
to rupture.

Distribution of Labor in the Network
Contention over volunteer versus paid labor arose from the arguably inherent
incompatibility between self-management and processed-focused organizers. Sean mentions part
of the group especially wanted the Public House to be involved in job creation, rather than being
volunteer run. Levi and Sean both recounted that some members believed a volunteer workforce
was the only way for the business to be sustainable, at least in the beginning. This tension over
labor would be a recurring issue as the network grew in size.
As people began to rely more and more on the material reality of the bar, labor became an
even bigger point of conflict. Initially everyone involved was a volunteer. As bartenders, they
received tips. Levi said this decision was made so that the bar could open without the overhead
of paying employees.
When we first started out the board members were going to be volunteer
bartenders and we’ll live on tips… Legally you can’t have unpaid workers getting
tips.
This introduction of wages brought to light a pivotal conflict inside the network between actors
who earned a wage and those who decided on a wage (some individuals fell into both
categories). Levi stated that once the bar became more polarized between directors and
employees, the rift deepened.
We had not started out with a plan that we are going to pay this wage, we started
off like, it’s just us and we are doing it for volunteer-sake because we want to get
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this thing off the ground. And then, no we have to pay ourselves for tax purposes.
So that $3.33 an hour was the least we could pay ourselves… And then a year
later some of the bartenders were like, we are only earning 3.33 an hour and that’s
terrible, the worst possible wages you can make, this is ridiculous… So there was
some internal debate going on about is our social responsibility to be open and to
be a space in the neighborhood? Is our responsibility to pay our workers a decent
wage? What is a decent wage?
Unlike a conventional business where, at such an impasse, a CEO, manager, or sole proprietor
would default as the head of the organization and make the decision, at the Public House, texts
and the over-arching narrative of cooperative ownership held them together. Texts like the
Manifesto, bylaws, codes of conduct, and other co-created texts enrolled individual founders
long enough to coordinate action, but failed to address deep contradictions and tensions the texts
embodied. Already, the story was beginning to fray around the edges.

Workers Collective: An Uneasy Network Compromise
The Workers Collective was a sort of compromise between self-management and the
process-oriented camps. The Manifesto both created and legitimized the Worker Collective
within the Public House network, additionally legitimized through other co-created texts like the
mission statement and bylaws. As the employee branch of the Public House, it evolved to
include all paid employees, contractors, and volunteers. As Levi pointed out, at the formation of
the bar, individuals volunteered to staff the bar. Over time, the positions developed into
permanent paid positions (Sean, Levi) and these positions were inscribed into a document
entitled “Job Descriptions & division of labor for the Public House Workers’ Collective.” Each
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position was occupied by an individual who had been working at the bar for some time, in some
cases since it opened. Levi points out that only people with prior experience in these jobs filled
the finance and managerial positions.

Workers Collective Texts
According to Sean and Levi, many of the earliest organizers of the Public House felt that
having a separate, self-managing collective aligned with the bylaw value-statement of “collective
worker management.” Cultivate Coop explains the difference between a worker cooperative and
a worker collective.
A worker collective is a particular kind of worker cooperative. A worker
collective adheres to the same cooperative principles as does a worker
cooperative. However, worker collectives also adopt a non-hierarchical (often
called a “flat” or “horizontal”) management structure. This means that all workers
are equal co-managers: nobody has un-recallable decision-making power or
authority over another worker. Smaller decisions may be made by individuals,
department teams, or committees, but all collective members participate in both
major management and governance decisions. (cultivate.coop)
Several documents enrolled the position of the Workers Collective within the structure of the
Public House. These texts are important in understanding the parameters and responsibility of the
Workers Collective to the Board of Directors and vice versa. Another text that supported the
Workers Collective is the organizational chart in the Riverwest Public House Board Manual.
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Figure 5: Structure Chart from Board Manual, p. 18

According to this model, the Workers Collective consisted of bartenders and “auxiliary
positions: events, inventory, finance, and Fancy Pants (“Workers Collective Intro to New
Hires”). Each auxiliary position was decided through group agreement and transcribed in “Job
Descriptions & division of labor for the RWPH Workers Collective,” formalizing the positions
into the structure of the Workers Collective and into the overall structure of the Public House.

Network Positions
These four positions together formed a general manager. All necessary managerial tasks were to
be covered by the four. Out of all of these positions, no one had unrecallable authority over
another (cultivate.coop; Zeuli and Cropp 37). The formalized descriptions, boundaries, and
duties of each were clearly bounded and transcribed, which became a circulating artifact within
the network. The Fancy Pants role evolved to be a catch-all position, intended to catch loose ends
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and to “bottom-line,” that is, to ensure tasks were completed (Board of Directors; Workers
Collective). The title Fancy Pants was chosen over “manager” or “lead,” intending to subvert
some of the authority of a bottom-liner. According to Sean, the term Fancy Pants was a ludic jab
at the authority granted to a manager.
My recollection is that it was Sophia who first said it and did so tongue-in-cheek,
mocking how we were going to have a manger-like roll despite the fact we were a
workers collective. I think it stuck because, as a workers collective, we didn't
want to acknowledge fully that we were implementing managerial structure but at
the same time did recognize that we needed leadership from someone with
bartending experience (most bartenders were newbies when we first opened). So
we just made light of the position and continued calling Xavier’s position fancy
pants.
What “bottom-lining” means is spelled out in the job description for Fancy Pants: “They will be
tasked with overseeing the bar as a whole and is the “go-to bartender for training, quality control,
and day-to-day personnel issues or questions” (Job Descriptions & division of labor for the
Public House Workers’ Collective”).
The term “bottom-liner” or “bottom-line” is a colloquialism that seems to mean the one
who makes sure it happens, the one who will take responsibility if it doesn’t (Board of Directors;
Workers Collective). A Workers Collective with a lead or pseudo-manager introduces the tension
from the start, and in a sense is a step away from collectivity. At best, it institutes hybridity
between horizontal and vertical structures.
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Figure 6: Founding Network

Figure 6 shows the network at the end of the first stage of organizing: the Workers Collective
was in place, along with several key texts. Included in this network is an actor who will come to
embody the philosophy of worker autonomy and collectivity: Sophia. A founder dedicated to
self-management, Sophia comes to play a role in the reorganizing of the Public House.
At the end of the first phase of organizing—after establishing the organization with the
city and within the neighborhood, and fulfilling the requirements of Wisconsin law—the network
included the Workers Collective, founders, and texts, hanging together through agreements and
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exchanges. Though these links were at times tenuous, the network was stabilized enough that the
organization could achieve common goals such as fundraising, opening, and operating.

Re-organization: The Destabilized Network Manages Innovation
As the network grew, it gradually added necessary texts that stabilized the organization
including bylaws, job descriptions, and an organizational chart. As new actors came in, the
network shifted to include new positions and new links between new texts and human actors.
Because of the lack of disciplinary regulation, exacerbated by the tensions between selfmanagement and process, managerial oversight of the day-to-day operations of the bar—
tentatively embodied in the Fancy Pants position—deteriorated and links began to fray. As new
actors were enrolled and other actors left the network, tensions that had existed since inception
began to re-emerge within the stabilized-for-now texts and within the network.
While texts reified the Workers Collective within the structure of the Public House
overall, there were few internal texts within the Workers Collective. Without formal structure
and other mechanisms like evaluations, peer review, clear protocols for a rule infraction, or even
a general code of conduct, the few extent workplace procedures in place could be difficult to
enforce. As business increased and expanded, founders left to pursue other projects and
employees arrived who did not have the same relationship to the texts as the founders who
drafted them, for whom they represented a compromise. Without founders to re-inscribe intent
continually, interpretations began to shift. Once again, the lack of texts outlining procedures and
formal mechanisms of power led to disruptions in the network. Only this time, people began to
notice.
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Destabilizing the Network: Failures in the Texts
It is difficult to trace where it began, but by March 2014, changes in the network brought
tensions to a head. The failure to create texts outlining formalized roles and procedures of the
network, and an increasing reliance on the Fancy Pants to interpret and implement the extant
informal and formal procedures, leading to the re-emergence of disconcordance between selfmanagement and process perspectives and an increasingly destabilized network. The Workers
Collective began to experience failure indicated by four events.
First, Lucas, acting as Fancy Pants, noticed that money was missing from the safe and
reported it. This information was sent out via email to the Board of Directors for response and
action (Lucas).
Second, the energy company almost disconnected power for lack of payment. A
happenstance meeting between Lucas and the energy company stopped the disconnection (Lucas,
“A Couple of Issues…”). A disconnection would have been disastrous to a business with a razorthin financial margin.
Third, rent was past due. The newly signed and negotiated lease stated checks must be
sent before the first of the month in a three-month batch, post-dated. The first batch was not sent
on time and therefore rent was late, putting the Public House in violation of a newly signed,
renegotiated lease. The Board of Directors, the legal representatives of the business, were not
aware of this failure until the property owner contacted them through email (Emily, “Re: A
Couple of Issues…”)
Fourth, in addition to the financial management problems, inventory was suffering. When
the bar is short on supplies, Lucas and other bartenders paid retail prices for beer, liquor, or other
bar supplies, a costly fix that eliminates profit. While running out of critical inventory, other
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inventory ran amok. A critical item missing from the job descriptions, and not designated to be
anyone’s job, was a tracking system for the inventory of the bar including liquor, beer, wine, soft
drinks, and snacks. Additionally, the inventory position was not in communication with the
finance system, but Fancy Pants communicated with both independently, attempting to fill in the
gaps of all the positions. The slippage in inventory was also costly. The Fancy Pants, who has
many years of bar manager experience, resolved to tighten inventory, filling gaps in job
descriptions and accountability. He noted part of the problem was the formalized job roles were
unclear:
The problem is that we have redundancies - multiple people getting paid to do the
same job - the job isn’t really getting done and we’re paying twice for it. That’s
fiscally totally unsound. (Board of Directors)
In each case, Lucas must either act autonomously, contrary to the self-management culture of the
bar, or allow failure.
Lucas filled multiple job duties, an indication that job descriptions were inadequate
without disciplinary mechanisms or structure in place. In the case of Sophia, the lack of
formalized description made it difficult to assess the efficacy of the position. For example, there
was confusion over whether or not the finance position required QuickBooks entries. Without a
car, she was unable to make daily deposits. Lucas picked up delivery of the deposits, but they
were made infrequently, which made tracking money difficult and left large sums in the bar. To
add to the confusion, in violation of the bylaws, the treasurer position was vacant since the last
treasurer resigned suddenly. Additionally, there was no real-time tracking of hours for the
auxiliary positions.
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The situation became critical as the bar quickly lost money and became reliant on wellattended events to carry the bar from month to month, and eventually week to week. The bar was
on the edge of insolvency, barely able to pay monthly bills, and then paychecks. In a desperate
move, employees volunteered to give up paychecks until the situation was resolved.
Frustrations built to the boiling point: lack of payment of bills, lack of understanding of
the finances, lack of control of inventory, and lack of real-time tracking of working hours (Board
of Directors; Special Finance Meeting). Meeting notes from the months before the change
reflected their deep anxiety: “Financial situation is dire,” “We had a record February in terms of
sales but came out with a $50 profit,” “Put positive energy out there even if we’re freaking out
internally” (Board of Directors).
Sensing the threat to the existence of Public House, the Board of Directors instituted a
series of changes, exerting a rare moment of top-down authority upon the Workers Collective,
suspending collectivism and participatory management, ultimately unveiling the schism that had
been present since its founding.

Stabilizing the Network: Reorganization
With the help and consent of the Workers Collective, the Board terminated all positions
and consolidated them into two positions: Front-of-the-House, and Back-of-the-House. These
two positions were understood as temporary fixes for a nine-month period, until the financial and
managerial fractures could be resolved. All current Workers Collective members were open to
apply. The Board hired Lucas as the Front-of-the-House and Will as the Back-of-the-House, a
financial-focused managerial position. On April 26, 2014, the new job descriptions and positions
were voted on and accepted. When asked about the problem with asymmetry power relations
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between a general manager and the Workers Collective, the notes on that day recorded Will’s
response.
Will argues that the Workers collective has no shortage of great goals and great
ideas, but where we need the GMs is to enforce these. Workers collective decides
the what, and the GMs decide the how. We are creating these jobs so that in 9
months everybody has clarity about how everything works/needs to work.
Will’s response points toward the general acceptance that there was a need for “enforcement”
and “clarity,” a general acceptance that self-management had failed. Previously, the prevailing
philosophy of management was free-form, open, and dynamic; now, the organization moved
toward bureaucratization and centralization, a resounding rebuff of self-management in favor of
process.
Critically, the organizational narrative shifted to support this change in philosophy. The
stories the Public House once told about itself shifted from open support of the self-management
perspective to the idea that a process perspective would better direct the organization.
One example of this shift is how bylaws came to be re-read in service of the
reorganization. Whereas before, as embodied in the bylaws, collectivity was said to be valued
very highly and centralization of authority was resisted. Several board members and employees
voiced concern that instituting the change in focus from a collective to a managerial structure
necessitated a bylaw change (Board of Directors). According to Wisconsin law, however, bylaw
changes would need to be voted on by the membership (Wisconsin Statute §185.07). This vote
did not occur; rather, the bylaws come to be reinterpreted to support the reorganization. This
reinterpretation occurred across several organization documents and their internal narrative. That
is, in support of network changes, the narrative shifted from a refusal to compromise on values of
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collective management even if they closed their doors, to doing whatever it took to keep the bar
open, even if it meant compromising on values and ideals it started with. This shift was
necessary to bring about stability. The rifts between the self-management and process regimes
was untenable.
The network morphed from a structure of self-management to include new systems of
oversight management; documents came to be interpreted in light of the changes made.

Figure 7: Changes in Network Enrollments
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Figure 7 shows the transition of the Public House network, with multiple texts and individuals
enrolled. Now a robust network, supplying multiple jobs, stability became a critical need. At this
time, Sophia’s enrollments were still intact, even as the narrative shifted.

Transmission of Change: Employee Handbook
So what happened to the Manifesto? During this period of dynamic philosophical and
structural change, what happened to the document that had once been the cornerstone of
compromise at the Public House?
By the time of my study, the Manifesto had fallen out of use. In fact, my research brought
the existence of the Manifesto to the attention of some the current employees and directors who
were previously unaware of its existence. In the passage of time from the foundation of the
Public House, where the Manifesto served as the keystone of coordinated action, many
supportive texts had become enrolled in the network. Between these supportive texts, oral
histories, and organizational narratives, the Manifesto was no longer looked to as a point of
cohesion. As the Manifesto did not address disciplinary concerns, it provided no insight to the
current problems. Concurrently, as the Manifesto embodied the compromises from the founding
group, as it fell aside, so did the social capital of the founders embedded in it.
As Front-of-the-House, with full board support, Lucas decided to create an employee
handbook, a normalizing document that would have been unthinkable in the wild hay days of
self-management. The employee handbook, codifying expectations for work, concretized an
asymmetrical power dynamic earliest proponents of self-management would have objected to
resolutely.
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At this point, the mantra “for the good of the co-op” and a drive toward solvency
becomes a force of change and a point of cohesion for the group. Rather than arguing over small
details, as Robert and Lucy pointed out, agreements formed around best practices for the
cooperative, even at the expense of ideals present at its founding. The employee handbook
represented this cohesion.

Figure 8: Worker Handbook Cover
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The cover is noticeably different from the Manifesto, which recalled stenciled, radical and
militant street fliers. Instead, the font type is rounded and minimalist. The new logo includes the
raised fists of the old logo, but with a more polished look. Rather than a banner behind the hands,
there is a circle. The handbook is bound in a three-ring binder for easier addendum. Absent is a
Table of Contents because, unlike the Manifesto, the handbook was intended to be an evolving
document and not a concretization of compromises born through conflict.
The second page is a welcome with armed revolutionary figures, calling to mind the
Zapatistas or an anarchist black bloc. In an almost schizophrenic manner, this image and the
emphasis on collectivity in the passage hark back to the self-management focus of the earliest
organizers, organizers who identified as anarchists and radicals.
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Figure 9: Welcome
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The explanatory tone of the passage serves multiple purposes: not only does it introduce new
hires, but it also persuades readers to an authorized vision of the bar. In his work on narrative and
organizational change, Faber remarks, “Each organization is a constant site of discursive
struggle” (103) and “…narrative acts as an instrument of power within organizations as
predominant narratives structure how people view their organizational environment” (31). Words
like “we,” “us,” and “ourselves” identify the reader as part of the Public House. The passage
mentions two goals at the bottom of the welcome: a source for a right answer and consistency.
In stark contrast to self-management (i.e., workers as a resource and the do-it-yourself
ethic of the bar), “Welcome” functions as a normative text, a precursor for the rest of the
document.
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Figure 10: Checklist
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This example of a checklist, one of many found in the handbook, describes the correct
procedures for opening the bar, unveiling the normative nature of the handbook. The passive
voice and implied “you” veils writers’ authority. Lucas’s extensive experience as a bartender and
as Fancy Pants, coupled with the authority granted him by the Board, enabled the creation of a
top-down document systematizing one particular procedure over another. Other writings in the
document did include procedures drafted by someone else (me), the inclusion of which was a
decision made by the book’s creators.
Just as the Manifesto enacted the tensions within the bar, so the handbook enacted the
recent tensions between worker collective management and top-down management, between
self-management and process. Like the Manifesto, the employee handbook represented
compromises to facilitate coordinated action. Unlike the Manifesto whose purpose was
conciliatory (Sean), this handbook was normative. Uncomfortable with complete top-down
authority, the Welcome brings up collectivity and shared governance, while the checklists harken
a systematizing of policy incompatible with self-management—unless the workers co-create
those policies. In this case, however, authorized by the Board of Directors (“Leadership MeetingDivvyed Job Descriptions Updated 4.26.14”), Lucas created those policies and instituted them
via the handbook, ultimately vastly improving procedures and practices.
The handbook came to replace the Manifesto, which resolutely ceased to be enrolled in a
network. The handbook became the new agreed-upon text that enabled coordinated action.

Dismissal of a Founder and Completion of Change
As the network changed, so actors came to relate to each other differently. The new
handbook and other peripheral texts came to be enrolled or reinterpreted in service of changes in
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enrollments. This change is most demonstrated by a defining governance event: the removal of a
founder, Sophia.
In a collective, termination is difficult because of the diffusion of responsibility into a
crowd. How did a democratic group collectively fire one of their own? Answer: It was
enormously difficult, but the underlying narrative of the necessity to keep the business open (“for
the good of the co-op”) countered the loss of friendships and motivated the group to coalesce and
fire an individual. For the fired individual, it not only leads to a loss of material goods, but also
to a sense of betrayal. One of the effects of having a manager formally authorized to move into a
network position is that a manager can take on the uncomfortable issue of discipline. For the
Public House, having a Front-of-the-House manager resolved the diffusion of responsibility in a
self-management system. Without this position, termination may not have happened at all.
Only one other individual has been fired during this research: a new hire who assaulted a
customer. The notes state:
This person’s employment is terminated, but they may reapply after 6 months.
This is a serious incident, and the board is making the decision not because the
workers collective failed but because it is a legal liability and explicitly in
violation of our policies intolerant of violence. (Board of Directors)
Up until the impending termination, this is the only event on record.
In the process of the Worker Collective network changes, an incident happened involving
a founder. As a founder associated with the DIY self-management faction, Sophia held authority
in the organization as a long-time employee, a founder, and a person with a large network of
enrollments. Members of the Workers Collective, including myself, made formal complaints
about her actions, understood by some to be disruptive.
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Lucas’s and Sophia’s authority were in conflict. Though complaints had occurred in the
past, this event was handled dramatically different because of the shift of authority between
invisible/informal and visible/formal power and because policies had begun to be codified.
Because of her position, described by Marco and Lucy as “founder,” Sophia operated with an
invisible power, giving her more agency than others had. The informal, loose social structure of
the Public House allowed Sophia to operate within this invisible power, which, in part, protected
her job and gave authority to her words, even when they were unpopular.
With support from the Board of Directors, Lucas was given a formal role and formal
authority within the Workers Collective. This authority was demonstrated when the Board turned
to him with questions during a crisis; his position to speak and make changes without talking to
someone else about it, and his posture at the table during a meeting showed Lucas assumed
responsibility for certain tasks. Once the Board of Directors selected Lucas to be the arbitrator of
discipline, his formalized authority and informal authority like Sophia’s were in conflict. Lucas
had formalized authority through the Board and in writing and because of effective changes he
made on his own initiative, was recognized as legitimate by the Workers Collective and the
Board. In these ways, Lucas grew in authority. On the other hand, the old order of selfmanagement diminished as the Workers Collective and the Board came to accept and institute
formalized offices, authority, and structure.
Sophia’s invisible power was on the downslope at the same time Lucas’s was on the
upswing. Lucas’s capacity to enroll many actors created a stable and powerful position. When
the inevitable moment came when Sophia’s invisible, informal power came into conflict with
Lucas’s visible, formalized power, Lucas was in a position of authorized power. Sophia lacked
the linkages to be re-enrolled in the network.
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In only a few months, Lucas instituted structure that previously did not exist and he did it
by positioning himself rhetorically, enrolling other actors through the creation of the employee
handbook, making withdrawals on the authority that the Board had given him, and enacting that
authority into the habits of the workplace. Leveraging power in this way, Lucas also affected
change in personnel.
Sophia was a founder who at times conflicted with other founders and with certain texts
like the newly adopted job description, as well as the incident report, of which more than one
were filed against her, including one by me. Sophia was not enrolled with a job description as—
unlike the other positions—the finance position job description was never written into “Job
Descriptions & division of labor for the RWPH Workers’ Collective.” Still, Sophia had enough
strong enrollments that regardless of conflicts, she was continually enrolled in the networks
through multiple translations of interests. Over time, as the network and translations shifted, she
had fewer enrollments and eventually found herself displaced from the network. No longer reenrolled, Sophia was terminated from her position. Though Sophia was in conflict from the
beginning with some actors including nonhumans and humans alike, as long as she had
enrollments, she was included in the network. Once those enrollments fell away, she was
excluded from the network, shown in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Dissolution/Remaking of Network

This is where the contradictions in philosophy come to a head. Lucas and Sophia each embodied
the conflicted perspectives of the Public House; their conflicts dramatized the philosophical
schizophrenia of the structure. Sophia’s firing is a resounding rejection of the self-management
philosophy, at least temporarily.
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Reinterpretation and Change in the Workers Collective
The transformation at the Public House has resulted in a total overhaul of the structure of
the Workers Collective. In addition to eliminating positions, decision-making power was
consolidated into the hands of two people who, in effect, had autonomy to make decisions
without input from the Workers Collective. For example, whereas in the past, hiring decisions
were made jointly between HR, the Fancy Pants, and the Workers Collective, and approved by
the Board of Directors, the Front-of-the-House could hire without input from others and
implement sweeping changes without approval or discussion from the Collective. These acts
created a hierarchy, a vertical accountability between the workers and the Front-of-the-House
and Back-of-the-House. If Front-of-the-House and Back-of-the-House could both command, but
not be commanded, that is a hierarchy. This kind of authority is key to hierarchy, but also to
efficiency, something the Public House desperately needed in order to survive. The authors of
the job descriptions, who included Sophia, understood that the ability for the pseudo-managers to
act with autonomy was integral to a functioning, streamlined, efficient business. And they
selflessly enacted change understanding what it might mean for their own positions.
This move away from self-management to centralization and process was in part a move
away from management that is flat, all-hands-in, heterogeneous, and arguably more democratic
even if it was slow, at times inefficient, and capable of being co-opted or unduly influenced by
agendas or personal conflicts.
Whether the new structure can be re-done after the probation period remains to be seen.
At the time of writing, decision-making power has remained consolidated on “behalf of the
Board” (Board of Directors). The Workers Collective moved toward more bureaucracy in the
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form of record keeping, log keeping, and reporting, and shifted away from mutual monitoring to
a transcription of practices.
Time management is one example of this move. Lucas sent out an email directing
bartenders to clock in and out (“Time Clock”). The punch card system is a direct carryover from
Taylorist regulations and control the use of employees’ time, with the employee allowed to work
as needed and as the manager determines (Longo 2000; Rinehart 2006; Winsor 1996; Zuboff
1988). At IEM, employees were expected to give a certain amount of hours but were in control
of when they came in (Billeaux et al. 2011). IEM is a manufacturing plant and not a consumer
cooperative. However, in a bar, when a worker doesn’t show up on time, another worker is
forced to stay beyond their shift to cover for it, despite Front-of-the-House and the Back-of-theHouse having control of their own labor hours, self-record, and report, and have flexibility
(Board of Directors). This imbalance in management was previously unheard of when even a
code of conduct was met with resistance. Of this resistance to process, Robert said,
Sometimes you’d have people who were staunchly anti-process being like okay
I’ll be on that committee. Sure. They ended up stifling any progress, so it was like
they would give us an inch and we would take it and run with it and it would die
because we didn’t have critical mass to have anyone follow through with it. So
that happened with HR policies, with finance policies, a lot of which some people
spent a lot of time spending energy into writing budgets and some calendars and
writing policy and it never really became something that got taken up or the
committee dissolved or nobody was showing up any more or people would stop
responding to email, or come to the meeting when we had a final draft. It was
exhausting.
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While the “anti-process,” DIY, anarchist culture dominated the Public House prior to the
financial meltdown, the focus shifted to support process, managerial oversight, and discipline.
The movement to greater time regulation and recordkeeping of employee movements came to be
seen as a response to the lack of trust, the feeling of “taking advantage of” the ease of the Public
House’s culture.

Post-Mortem
Herein lies the difficulty: without more accurate record keeping, the Public House may have
ceased to exist. The move away from collectivism was not a political maneuver by a few power
hungry individuals, but actions taken by people who wanted to keep the doors open for business.
The narrative included phrases like:


“It’s for the good of the Public House.”



“We believe in this place and we want it to survive, so we have to do whatever is
necessary to keep it open.”

These two lines could justify a drastic action that the rest of the Board supports, and if good
people are on the Board who are genuinely concerned with the wellbeing and survival of the
Public House it may not be bad. After all, the Board is elected to do that very thing.
Nevertheless, as was the case before the change in management, there was no mechanism
in place for stalling one strong group of people or co-opting the process for an agenda. In a group
of people who viewed themselves as dedicated to the mission of Public House, educated about
cooperatives and cooperative development, involved in the process, the chance for manipulation
was lessened. However, if those same people can be convinced that a drastic action is necessary,
the Board could move with swiftness and unanimity, possibly into a direction that is not in line
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with the mission.
The movement away from a collectivist approach toward a managerial approach could be
viewed as counter to the bylaws, a matter of interpretation. At the time, it was viewed as a
necessary emergency move. At the Annual General Meeting, two individuals spoke openly about
the move away from collectivism as a necessary move in order to save the bar. At another time,
when concerns were brought up on whether or not what the Board was instating meshed with the
bylaws, the response was that the bylaws vaguely state the Board was being true to the values of
the Workers Collective. The over-arching narrative had to be maintained, even while being rewritten.
One could view the move away from collectivism as a move toward what is easier: a
standard managerial structure. It is far more difficult to be a collective, to find solutions that do
not turn centralization of power and control into the hands of a trained, responsible few. It is not
clear if the Public House had the means or time to find those solutions. Looking at the financial
reports, the human resources reports, the morale of the bar, one could argue it was the necessary,
inevitable thing to do when mutual monitoring and self-regulation failed.
So is this a story about how collectivism failed? I would argue it’s a story about how a
large group of people came together to save their co-op, even if it meant some folks losing their
jobs and some of the control they had over their work. I would also argue it is a story still being
written.
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Chapter 5: Implications for Future Research
Chapters 1 and 2 laid the foundation of my study, providing a literature review,
introducing cooperatives as relevant to professional communication, and presenting the
methodologies and methods I used in this project, namely, why actor-network theory and genre
theory were the most relevant frameworks for analysis. In Chapters 3 and 4, I examined the
relationships that underpinned genres in the Public House networks, the impact of textual
practice on their values, and the process of change that occurred as tensions came to a head. In
this final chapter, I return to the issue of cooperative development from the lenses of the
cooperative scholars covered earlier to posit tangible recommendations for relevant fields of
study. Recommendations fall into three categories: implications for genre and actor-network
theory, cooperative development, and professional communication.

Implications for Actor-Network and Genre Theory
My study suggests cooperatives are fertile ground for new applications of genre and actornetwork theory. This past summer, a colleague and I published an article in which we drew from
my application of actor-network theory to the Public House’s Board of Directors to discover
ways researchers and practitioners could use actor-network theory in nonprofit board governance
research. We suggested actor-network theory as a way of “opening the black box of
governance.”
In order to dismantle and examine power relations inside and outside the
boardroom—in other words, to open the black box of governance politicking,
power struggle, and actual board behavior and decision making—we may need to
go beyond the established framework and images and begin to pull in alternative
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views and ideas to better comprehend questions such as who really governs. One
such alternate perspective is the concept of the dominant coalition… but while the
dominant coalition lens provides an alternative entry point, we must also examine
the issue from multiple perspectives… One such perspective that brings useful
insights to the study of dominant coalitions (as well as nonprofit governance) is
actor-network theory (ANT). (Andersson and Edenfield 2)
Our research pointed to the usefulness of actor-network theory in understanding board relations,
that is, rather than viewing the board as a unified body, actor-network theory provided us a
framework to understand the discrete facets of the governance process. Particularly suitable for
unpacking board governance because of its flattened nature, actor-network theory is also a
radical shift from approaches solely focused on the human element as central to governance.
Actor-network theory offers researchers and practitioners a way to account for all aspects of the
governance process including nonhuman elements like texts, disease, physical space, etc., and
for the shifting enrollments and allegiances characteristic of governance.
In addition to actor-network theory, this study suggests important findings for genre
theory, underscoring the importance of understanding not only who writes texts, but also who
interprets them, for that interpretation can have widespread and lasting implications on the
organization. To date, genre theory has not yet explored strategic ambiguity and its effects,
particularly in horizontal organizations. My research suggests genre studies should look more
closely at the political implications of strategic ambiguity in documentation and in governance.
In the case of the Public House, ambiguity was an often-used strategy of cohesion and
coordinated action; however, this ambiguity also allowed broad interpretation, precipitating a
need for a “normed” interpretation not everyone had access to or could participate in, ultimately
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undermining values of democratic participation and, eventually, the business itself. What may be
of interest for genre theorists in professional communication is how strategic ambiguity can be
used to enable and constrain participants in organization documentation.
In 1984, Eric M. Eisenberg identified ambiguity as a strategy in organizational
communication: “People in organizations confront multiple situational requirements, develop
multiple and often conflicting goals, and respond with communicative strategies which do not
always minimize ambiguity, but may be nonetheless effective” (228). He goes on to say, “When
communicating with close friends, incomplete phrases and vague references may engender high
degrees of clarity… the same message strategies applied in less close relationships may lead to
confusion and ambiguity” (230). Applied to the Public House’s earliest genres, messages that
were incomplete or ambiguous were clear to the original writers, friends, and neighbors with
shared context and culture. In addition, as Sean pointed out, his sticky note organizing tool
“helped to—I think—pull everybody together.” Eisenberg states this cohesion is exactly the
point: organizational documents are ambiguous in order to encourage multiple perspectives and
to respect different interpretations of organization documents, especially in mission documents.
Strategic ambiguity fosters multiple viewpoints in organizations. This use of
ambiguity is commonly found in organizational missions, goals, and plans…
Strategic ambiguity is essential to organizing because it allows for multiple
interpretations to exist among people who contend that they are attending to the
same message… It is a political necessity to engage in strategic ambiguity so that
different constituent groups may apply different interpretations… (231)
Applying Eisenberg’s insights of ambiguity in organizational writing to the Public House shows
that the ambiguity of documents like the Manifesto, mission statement, and bylaws was a
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strategy, whether intentional or not, to “allow for multiple interpretations” to support coordinated
activity of heterogeneous groups, promoting “unified diversity” (230).
Nevertheless, this strategy was shortsighted because as workers and volunteers left and
were replaced, people were less united around an interpretation. For example, in the case of the
bylaws, to someone outside of the writing process or even the culture of Public House, the
phrasing of the first article of the first bylaw is unclear as a mission statement.
…to uphold cooperative standards of democracy, equality, self-responsibility,
equity and solidarity and strives to operate in accordance with the values of
collective worker management, living wages, strong community involvement,
safe environment, responsible drinking and local products…
The article does not define what “cooperative standards” and “values of collective worker
management” mean. Words that are fraught and/or contentious in many contexts enable and even
encourage multiple interpretations among members and reflect disparate views among the
writers of the documents. These multiple interpretations are, in part, responsible for the
showdown between the two philosophical positions of process and self-management.
Importantly, scholars have expressed concern that textual ambiguity can lead to ethical
ambiguity (Eisenberg and Goodall 1993; Paul and Strbiak 1999). While the results of my
research point to the necessity of ambiguity in uniting diverse viewpoints for organized action in
the beginning, ambiguity also created ethical dilemmas. For instance, the Board initially flagged
a bylaw revision as necessary, but bylaws were in fact not changed or updated to reflect the
change in structure. Instead, participants reinterpreted the bylaw to justify the change. The
potential ethical and legal issues of this kind of ambiguity are troublesome. On the other hand,
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the ability to pivot quickly enabled fast response to the crisis at hand, contributing to solvency
and creating/maintaining jobs in the neighborhood.
Without hierarchy or structural mechanisms that guide the interpretive process, ambiguity
will result, perhaps necessarily. Clarity may require a centralized viewpoint not possible in a
direct democracy. The kinds of negotiation embodied in the Public House genres may be an
inevitable part of a horizontal business.
Nevertheless, I believe my study points to the potential pitfalls of ambiguity in
governance genres within a cooperative. Ambiguity as a compromise between incommensurable
positions certainly led to a clash from which many businesses may not have survived. Genre
studies has not yet studied this kind of political and textual complexity in a flattened
organization, but given the meteoric rise of the cooperative and collective, this may be fertile
ground for exploration.

Implications for Cooperative Development
Cooperative development has benefited from many fields of study including geography,
urban studies, and nonprofit administration, but professional communication scholarship has yet
to examine the varied landscape of community-owned workspaces. My study suggests the
following for cooperative development and developers: pay attention to how cooperative
documentation is written, the effects of scale on that documentation, and whether that
documentation supports or undermines the co-op’s values.
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Effects of Documentation on Democratic Practice
According to cooperative scholars and practitioners, the cornerstone of a cooperative is
democratic control, the “one person, one vote” principle (Zeuli and Cropp 45; see also Cheney
1995; Murphy 2011; Riverwest Public House Cooperative Bylaws 2011). My study suggests
there is a correlation between control of the cooperative and access to documentation.
Cooperative founders and developers need to pay close attention to how they write documents,
who has access to the writing, revision, and reading of those documents, and whether or not the
documentation they produce reflects their value of democratic control.
In Chapter 1, I argued that without the bureaucratic structure of a hierarchy, social
practice created the conditions for power that become embedded in organizational genres
(Arendt 1961; Freeman 1970). Use of strategic ambiguity in writing the Manifesto not only
created the conditions for coordinated action, but also (necessarily) failed to fully resolve the
philosophical differences between the founders. Rather, the Manifesto suspended the divisions
for the moment in order to complete the required tasks: getting paperwork in order, filing forms
with the city, obtaining licenses, finding member-investors, writing necessary bylaws, and other
tasks essential to opening the cooperative. In addition, because of its ambiguity and intentional
omission of process and procedures—deemed too controversial by the incommensurable
factions—the Manifesto reified a practice of norming rather than transcribing process, a practice
that took place among friends and was exclusionary, ultimately undermining principles of
collective management. A reliance on norming through authorized interpretation enabled
unauthorized exertions of power. Zeuli and Cropp describe worker collective management as
“managed by the entire membership instead of a select membership team… a flat management
structure rather than a hierarchal one” (37). However, because of the way some documentation
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was written and interpreted by the group, in practice, only a select team could manage, creating
tensions between stated principles and practice.
While the omission was crucial to coordinated action at the time, it also set a precedent
that continued even as the cooperative grew in size, effectively constraining access for new
actors.

Effects of Scale on Management Practice
In the case of cooperatives, the success of a system seems directly connected to the scale
of operations. Tactics that work for a small-scale organization like San Francisco’s Other
Avenues Cooperative with 22 employees would not work for another cooperative in the same
city with almost 300 employees, Rainbow Cooperative. What worked for Public House with six
employees did not work when that staff was doubled, when more and more people came to rely
on the materiality of the business. In the beginning, the tight-knit group of founders, however
heterogeneous their philosophies, were able to come to agreement through informal, unwritten
rules, to socially manage the organization, and to rely on informal practices like mutual
monitoring (Billeaux et al. 2011; Polletta 2002). However, as the business grew and founders left
and were replaced by newcomers (and a lot of them), strategies that worked in the past strained
to keep up.
When scale increases (or decreases), needs change and writing strategies must also
change. Williams, Young-Hyman, and Cheney have each addressed the issue of scale and the
ways various cooperatives come to deal with it. Young-Hyman’s investigation of Union Cab
reveals that, as in the case of Public House, reorganization was necessary as scale increased
(2013). Tulais at Other Avenues Cooperatives revealed that their Board of Directors consciously
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decided to stay small in scope in order to exert greater control at the worker level and to allow
for idiosyncratic, emergent practices (personal correspondence). Williams and Cheney have
examined the issue of scale and considered the democratic challenges an expanding cooperative
could face (Cheney 1995; Williams 2007).
I recommend that cooperatives fully recognize scale as a condition when writing
organization documents, particularly within procedural and governing genres. While resolving
differences can risk stultification, ignoring or writing in ambiguity as a way of moving forward
from those differences does not eliminate and only delays them, simultaneously creating the need
for norms and narratives to address what has gone unprinted. As in the case of the Public House
and Union Cab, as scale increases, documentation that may have once been adequate needed to
be rewritten for changing networks.

Implications for Professional Communication Research
My research represents one of the first attempts to critically examine a cooperative
through the professional communication lens. So what can we learn from them and how can we
help cooperatives succeed?

Tension as a Condition for Innovation
Professional communication theories can learn from how worker cooperatives are able to
capitalize successfully on tensions that could stymie a business and how cooperators employ
these tensions as a source of innovation and creativity. The longevity of the cooperative model
has proven that they have calculated ways to capitalize on these tensions, as those who do not
successfully navigate these conflicts eventually close their doors.
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Research by Winsor, Longo, Clark, and Zachry have explored the relationship between
genres, power, and hierarchy, but current scholarship does not yet account for this nuanced
communication/productivity relationship. Research into worker cooperatives could be productive
as the complexity in communication in this kind of horizontal organization invites political and
social connections to direct the practices and even the ethos of the business. It is also productive
because, to be sustainable, these group agreements enable a cooperative structure to evolve as
needed while capitalizing on social ties in the community. For example, if a business begins to
falter, stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process, expediting corrective action.

Professional Communication Support for Cooperative Research
Below I look at three areas for application of professional communication concepts in
worker collective research: project management, genre theory, and productivity.
First, further research on cooperatives might include an examination of project
management in a worker cooperative. IEM has demonstrated great success with their project
management strategies, handling multi-million dollar engineering projects and thousands of
billable hours. They negotiate project management on a large scale while maintaining a
commitment to flat management and group agreement (Billeaux et al. 8-9). Previous research on
collaboration might bring an examination of the success of compromise and problem solving in
manufacturing and technical cooperatives where a heterogeneous, flat team accomplishes a
highly technical task over a long period.
Secondly, researchers may analyze the role of genres in a cooperative as this relationship
of power and texts can shed light on how genres are stabilized and constrained over time in a
highly social, relatively unstable group. Distributed cognition is an approach to genres that may
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enable a social analysis of genres in the worker cooperative. Distributed cognition is cognition
distributed across different people who enable each other’s work, who “supplement and support”
it (Winsor “Learning” 15), a concept highly applicable to worker cooperatives in which large
groups of people rely on communication to make informed decisions. Distributed cognition
approaches thinking as an act that takes place not completely inside an individual’s head, but
“that is distributed among the individual, other people, the physical environment, and the tools
the person uses, including language and such language structures as genres” (Winsor “Learning”
6). Stabilized-for-now genres are fundamental in systems of distributed cognition, which Winsor
advocates are the rule in workplaces, rather than the exception (Winsor “Learning” 5).
The process by which texts become generic and stabilized in a cooperative is a rich
example of distributed cognition. In Bitzer’s terms, texts respond to a rhetorical situation and
because these situations are repeated, a rhetorical response draws on the previous text, and a
generic text is developed: “Each text draws on previous texts written in response to similar
situations. Through such interaction of texts, genres evolve as recurring” (Devitt 338; Miller
1984). A text is understood as generic because they can be applied to multiple situations (e.g.,
employee codes of conduct or handbooks). These generic texts stabilize relationships and
regulate the actions of heterogeneous groups so they can work together (Winsor "Using” 3).
Because they are stable representations that people use to regulate each other, nowhere is this
feature more important than in the complex communication practices at the site of a worker
cooperative.
Thirdly, the important dialectic between power, communication, and productivity merits
further research. A worker cooperative is a key site to study this dynamic as some research
suggests worker cooperatives may outperform conventional enterprises (Craig and Pencavel,

131

1995; Murphy, 2011; Williams, 2007). Logue and Yates suggested as much in their study on
worker cooperatives where they established that the strength of worker cooperatives lies not in
the ownership model per se, but in participation and communication about finances, training, and
cultural changes (2001). Craig and Pencavel underlined the importance of communication and
agency in productivity: “worker-owners are more likely to be much better informed about
actions taken by managers than are non-worker-owners” (124). A better understanding of this
connection might potentially add to not only professional communication theories of effective
communication in the workplace, but also pedagogy, and organization and management research.
Finally, this research provides an opportunity to intersect professional communication
and social justice. In the case of my research site, Milwaukee is an intensely segregated city
fraught with a range of looming social issues including rampant violence, police brutality, and
poverty. In similar cities, cooperatives have been at the epicenter of social change. To study
communication at such a site prompts questions about the potential of this kind a business: can
joint ownership contribute to the transformation of a community? If so, what role could
university/community partnerships play in that transformation?

Conclusion
Looking forward, many questions remain. I look forward to expanding my rhetorical
analysis to include more cooperatives, particularly worker cooperatives, with an eye toward
making a substantial contribution of connecting professional communication research with the
cooperative model, and demonstrating to cooperatives the importance of rhetoric, especially
when writing documents. Two cooperatives I am interested in working with are the prisoner’s
cooperative in Puerto Rico and a trans Latina beauty shop in Queens, New York.
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What has been called “the world’s first prisoner cooperative” (Nzinga Ifateyo 2015), the
Cooperativa de Servicios ARIGOS commodifies prisoners’ artwork. Importantly, the cooperative
has been successful at reducing recidivism and has been linked to helping prisoners in a way that
traditional means have failed:
Through working with the art, a more important change took place—the inmates
changed themselves through constructive and satisfying work. “We started to
change the way we saw the world,” Rodriguez said. “It ended up transforming our
lives practically without us noticing… It was important for us because it allowed
us to be in contact with our community. This became part of our rehabilitation
process.” (Nzinga Ifateyo, 2015)
I would like to take a closer look at the connection between cooperation and rehabilitation by
tracing the texts they created and used through the process. I believe that doing so not only
supports the work they are already doing, but also contributes to one major question being asked
of the professional communication field: how can we move from talking about social justice to
enacting it?
In a similar vein, another cooperative I would like to examine more critically is a new
trans Latina women’s cooperative in New York City. Dekimpe writes, “Their business, the first
of its kind in New York City, aims to provide stable and dignified jobs for the women and to
serve as a model to other transgender workers who have faced employment discrimination.” This
cooperative was founded in part to help trans women have meaningful, dignified work. Dekimpe
writes,
A 2013 Make the Road survey of the LGBTQ community in Manhattan and
Queens found transgender and gender non-conforming individuals face the
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highest rates of unemployment among those surveyed. Forty-three percent of
transgender respondents said they were looking for a job; 40 percent said they had
experienced some form of discrimination based on their gender identity when
being considered for a job or promotion; and 44 percent said they had been forced
to quit a job because of discrimination they endured in the workplace. (2015)
Faced with such staggering statistics, the need for support is profound. As with Cooperativa de
Servicios ARIGOS, this cooperative is responding to a true, deep human need. Collaborating
with this kind of cooperative and supporting their work either through my own research or
through service-learning projects with students may contribute to their long-term success.
The trans Latina beauty shop is set in a backdrop of a larger cultural turn toward
cooperation, sharing, and bartering as economic alternatives to capitalism. In 2014, New York
City Mayor Bill de Blasio allocated a “historic $1.2 million initiative to fund the development of
worker cooperatives” (“New York City Invests $1.2 Million in Worker Cooperatives”).
Similarly, in Cleveland, Ohio; Jackson, Mississippi; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and all over the
country, administrators are turning toward worker cooperatives as a way of revitalizing areas and
providing human services in a fiscally conservative way. As such, I believe my research on the
role of rhetoric in cooperatives will support economic development, and begin to bridge the
divide between talking about social justice and enacting it.
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Appendix
Interview Questions
1. What can these negotiations teach us about productivity and power among workers
in smaller, loosely structured work groups?
If there are any, who are the heavy lifters at the RWPH? Why do you think they are in that
position? Do you think it helps or hurts the collective management structure of the workers
collective?
Are you content with the present structure of the workers collective?
What is the relationship, if any, between the present structure and your own productivity? Do
you feel more productive or less?
Would you say the structure of the workers collective is formal or informal? Would one way
work better than another?
Have there been times you personally felt the collective management structure failed or was in
danger of failing? If so, describe that situation.
Have there been times you wished the collective management structure was something different?
If so, describe the situation and what you would like to have been different.

2. What can collective management teach us about flexibility and appropriation of
workplace genres?
What are the most common tools you use to communicate? What is the most popular tool to use
for the group?
How effective do you think the communication tools you and other workers use are in
communicating about business matters?
How often do you refer back to cooperative documents (handbooks, job descriptions, bylaws,
emails, meeting notes, etc.) to figure out what to do, or what is expected of you? When you do,
what are you trying to do? How do the texts help you?
What’s best about workplace communication here?
What ways does communication sometimes fail or break down?
How do you think you use cooperative texts to complete your work tasks?
Name an instance where communication broke down. Why do you think it happened?
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3. How does the rhetoric of empowerment shape/become shaped by the Collective?
Describe the power a worker has at the Public House.
Looking back on your experiences of work at the Public House or other jobs, how have you felt
the collective management structure empowered you? Can you give an example?
How has it disempowered you?
What, if anything, have you given up by not having a manager or conventional business
structure?
What, if any, are the connections between management types and worker participation or sense
of ownership?
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WID Engineering Exchange Program, Engineering Materials (Pilot) (2012 - )
 Developed and taught communication curriculum for engineering students alongside lab
experimentation

149





Coordinated with Engineering, Communication, and English faculty and graduate
assistants to ensure success of program, including managing course materials, training on
course procedures, and coordinating online components in line with ABET requirements
Coordinated with Engineering faculty and graduate teaching assistants to ensure
congruence between lecture, lab, and communication assignments across 15 labs

Research Assistant to Associate Dean of Humanities (Spring 2015)
 Developed budget models for College of Letters and Science departments including
Philosophy, Communication, Economics, Foreign Languages, and Literature
 Established and managed a resource wiki for humanities faculty and advisors to improve
enrollment
 Tracked enrollment across humanities courses in order to consolidate courses and boost
enrollment in low-attended courses
Research Assistant, Department of English (Fall 2011)
 Revised Professional Writing track website including troubleshooting and testing for
usability
 Researched and compiled ideas to improve alumni outreach including newsletter and
featured stories

PROFESSIONAL COMMUNICATION EXPERIENCE
Assistant Developer, UWM Athletics Department (2015 - )
 Research and develop documents supporting broad fundraising activities including direct
mail and online appeals
 Develop content for donor and community partnerships, including letter, email, and web
writing
Assistant Researcher, Responsive Writing Solutions (2015)
 Co-wrote proposals for seed funding and grants for software development project
 Conducted and reported market and technical research, including competition reports and
interviews
Proposal Developer, Biomedical Engineering Department (Successful) (2014 - 2015)
 Researched and developed proposals for the development of a new Biomedical
Engineering Department and authorization of Biomedical Engineering B.S., M.S., and
Ph.D. degrees
 Collaborated with engineering faculty and Associate Dean of College of Engineering &
Applied Science to create and revise proposals to meet the standards of UW-System
Administration requirements
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Content Developer, Legal Action Wisconsin (Internship) (2009 - 2010)
 Researched, compiled, and revised organizational legacy documents
 Researched and edited web content including testimonies and case studies for multiple
stakeholders

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE
English 310: Writing, Speaking, and Technoscience in the 21st Century (2015 - )
 Contextualize engineering and science studies within technoscience and social problems
 Build and extend oral and written communication skills from previous coursework
 Equip students with more precise tools for analyzing audiences, both technical and nontechnical
Business Management 738: Critical and Analytical Thinking (Writing Coach) (2015 - )
 Co-instruct one of only six graduate critical thinking business courses in the U.S.
 Support graduate student learning of communication practices in business management
Materials Science and Engineering 201: Engineering Materials (Communication) (2012 - 2015)
 Facilitated communication assignments alongside experimental work in a materials
laboratory
 Focused on presentations, business reports, and other technical correspondence
 Introduced technical, semi-technical, and non-technical audiences
English 206: Technical Writing (GER) (2013 - 2014)
 Focused on technical writing as a rhetorical, social/cultural, problem-solving process
 Introduced memos, presentations, instructions, and software documentation
 Guided students in responding to different contexts and creating graphic and document
designs
English 205: Business Writing (GER) (2012 - 2014)
 Facilitated discussions and workshops where students analyze and respond to readings, as
well as writing choices in their own work
 Guided students through analyses of cases, employing problem-solving strategies
English 102: College Research and Writing (GER) (2011 - 2012)
 Taught reading and writing as recursive, interdependent processes and interpretive acts
 Introduced students to college research through a sequence of assignments in which
students pose and investigate questions in response to their reading of course texts
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English 101: Introduction to College English (GER) (2010 - 2011)
 Introduced college writing as a process to freshmen writers
 Asked students to read several challenging texts and to write and revise a significant
number of responses to those texts; students submit a portfolio of essays for assessment at
end of semester
HONORS AND AWARDS
Zeidler Center for Public Discussion, Milwaukee (2015)
Scholarship for attendance to facilitation training with expectation of community workshop
Student Success Award, UWM (2014)
Award recognizing a person UWM students named as someone who helped most in their success
The New Economy Coalition, National (2014)
Scholarship for USFWC conference attendance with expectation of community workshop
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